What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the likelihood of a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory? by AlResais, Mona Saad
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations Student Research 
Summer 6-15-2021 
What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum 
have on the likelihood of a lasting peace after a settlement in 
conflicts over territory? 
Mona Saad AlResais 
resais.2011@aucegypt.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
 Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, and the Political History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
AlResais, M. (2021).What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the likelihood 
of a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory? [Master's Thesis, the American University 
in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1541 
MLA Citation 
AlResais, Mona Saad. What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the 
likelihood of a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory?. 2021. American University in 
Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1541 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge 
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC 
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
1 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
  
What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the likelihood of a 
lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory? 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Department of Political Science 
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
 
By: Mona Saad Al-Resais  








Table of Contents 
Chapter 1- Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 6 
1. Research Questions/ Hypothesis ............................................................................................................ 9 
1.1 Case Selection ................................................................................................................................... 12 
2. Methodological Approaches ................................................................................................................. 14 
2.1 Independent Variables ...................................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Dependent Variable .......................................................................................................................... 19 
3. Chapter Structure of Thesis ................................................................................................................. 20 
Chapter 2- Literature Review and Theoretical framework .................................................................. 22 
1. Independent Variable Concepts .......................................................................................................... 22 
1.1 Sovereignty Referendum (Independent variable) ............................................................................. 22 
1.2 Peace Agreement Theory .................................................................................................................. 24 
1.3 Process/ Context/ Sequence of negotiation ....................................................................................... 26 
1.4 Third-party involvement and monitoring .......................................................................................... 28 
1.5 Power Parity ...................................................................................................................................... 30 
2. Success, Peace and Durability (Dependent Variable) ........................................................................ 31 
3. Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................................ 33 
3.1 Deliberative democratic theory ......................................................................................................... 36 
3.2 Costly Signal ..................................................................................................................................... 37 
3.3 Legitimacy ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
3.4 Time .................................................................................................................................................. 41 
Chapter 3- Bougainville ............................................................................................................................ 44 
1. Background ........................................................................................................................................... 45 
1.1 Panguna Mine ................................................................................................................................... 46 
2. Civil War................................................................................................................................................ 48 
3. Peace Process ......................................................................................................................................... 50 
3.1 Ripeness ............................................................................................................................................ 50 
3.2 End of Conflict and first phase of peace process (June 1997- June 1999) ........................................ 52 
3.2.1 Pre-negotiations ......................................................................................................................... 52 
3.3 Second phase of peace process (June 1999- August 2001) ............................................................... 54 
3.3.1 Deadlock on Referendum issue .................................................................................................. 54 
3.3.2 Deadlock Broken ........................................................................................................................ 56 
3 
 
4. BPA ........................................................................................................................................................ 58 
4.1 Incentives .......................................................................................................................................... 60 
5. The ‘Pacific Way’ and Regional intervention .................................................................................... 62 
6. Implementation History: 5 years ......................................................................................................... 65 
7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 69 
Chapter 4- Sudan ...................................................................................................................................... 72 
1. Background ........................................................................................................................................... 74 
1.1 Civil Wars ......................................................................................................................................... 76 
1.1.1 First Civil War (1955-1972) ...................................................................................................... 76 
1.1.2 The Second Civil War (1983-2005)............................................................................................ 77 
2. Peace Initiatives 1994-2005 .................................................................................................................. 79 
2.1 Declaration of Principles ................................................................................................................... 79 
2.2 Ripeness ............................................................................................................................................ 81 
2.2.1 External pressure ....................................................................................................................... 83 
2.2.2 Internal pressure ........................................................................................................................ 84 
2.3 Reinitiating of Peace Process ............................................................................................................ 85 
2.3.1 Machakos Protocol .................................................................................................................... 87 
3. CPA ........................................................................................................................................................ 89 
3.1 Incentives .......................................................................................................................................... 92 
4. Implementation History: 5 Years ........................................................................................................ 94 
4.1 Referendum ....................................................................................................................................... 97 
5. Regional and International Intervention ............................................................................................ 99 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 102 
Chapter 5- East Timor ............................................................................................................................ 104 
1.  Background ........................................................................................................................................ 106 
1.1 Indonesian Occupation .................................................................................................................... 107 
2. Ripeness ............................................................................................................................................... 109 
3. Tripartite Negotiations ....................................................................................................................... 112 
4. May 5 Agreement ................................................................................................................................ 114 
4.1 Incentives ........................................................................................................................................ 117 
5. Implementation History: 5 Years ...................................................................................................... 119 
5.1 UNAMET ....................................................................................................................................... 119 
4 
 
5.2 INTERFET ...................................................................................................................................... 122 
5.3 UNTAET......................................................................................................................................... 124 
5.3.1 Issue of Timing ......................................................................................................................... 127 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 131 
Chapter 6- Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 134 
1. Answer of question 1 & 1.1 ................................................................................................................ 134 
2. Answer to sub question 1.2 ................................................................................................................. 137 
2.1 Importance of postponement and interim periods ........................................................................... 138 
3. Ripeness and Windows of opportunity ............................................................................................. 141 
3.1 Internal and External Factors .......................................................................................................... 143 
4. External/regional intervention ........................................................................................................... 144 
5. Role of Individuals .............................................................................................................................. 150 
6. Limitations of Research ...................................................................................................................... 150 
7. Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................................... 152 














Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
APODETI Popular Democratic Association of Timorese  
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
BCC  Bougainville Constitutional Commission  
BIG  Bougainville Interim Government  
BPA  Bougainville Peace Agreement  
BRA  Bougainville Revolution Army  
BRF   Bougainville Resistance Forces  
BTG  Bougainville Transitional Government 
CNRT  National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction  
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
DoP  Declaration of Principles 
Fretilin Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor  
GA   General Assembly 
GoNU  Government of National Unity  
GoS   Government of Sudan  
GoSS  Government of South Sudan  
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development  
INTERFET International Force in East Timor  
JIUs  Joint Integrated Units  
NCC  National Consultative Council  
NCP  National Congress Party  
PNG  Papua New Guinea 
PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Forces 
SAF  Sudanese Armed Forces 
SC  Security Council  
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement  
SSRA   South Sudan Referendum Act 
SSRC  South Sudan Referendum Commission 
UDT  Democratic Union of Timorese 
UNMISET  United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor  
UNAMET  United Nations Mission in East Timor  
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan 
UNOMB United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville  
UNOTIL United Nations Office in East Timor  
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 




Chapter 1- Introduction 
Today, the field of conflict resolution is increasingly becoming influential due to the 
increase of conflicts that we are facing. While there are set standards of rules and procedures for 
dealing with conflicts that happen between states, this cannot be said when it comes to civil wars. 
What is sought when it comes to conflicts is either starting a peace process or restoring a failed 
one. What usually results from a peace process is a negotiated settlement that lays out several 
provisions to appease both sides to achieve a durable peace. Provisions in a peace agreement are 
a very important factor in a negotiated settlement especially in conflicts regarding self-
determination/ secession conflicts. Negotiated settlements in conflicts over territory increasingly 
contain provisions for referendums. The idea of a referendum on such cases is not a new 
phenomenon.  
There has been a long history of the use of referendum, serving a variety of political 
functions. Most of the boundary-related referendums were typically concentrated in Europe. One 
of the first examples of a modern-era sovereignty referendum, dating back to post-revolutionary 
France, was the referendum held in Avignon in 1791 to determine its integration into France.1 
There were around 13 referendums held in France between 1791-1799. The types of referendums 
that were held in France were for the transfer or reallocation of authority over a territory. The 
main logic behind those referendums was to provide political legitimacy to national unification 
 
1 Peter Radan, "Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 18, no. 
1 (2012): 8-21, doi:10.1080/13537113.2012.654083.; Fernando Mendez and Micha Germann, “Contested 
Sovereignty: Mapping Referendums on Sovereignty over Time and Space,” British Journal of Political Science 48, 
no. 1 (2018): 141–65. doi:10.1017/S0007123415000563; Ron Levy, “Shotgun Referendums: Popular Deliberation 
and Constitutional Settlement in Conflict Societies,” Melbourne University Law Review 41, no.3 (January 2018): 
1237-1277. http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=282744d3-33f0-4d03-84ea-
91e6a5bfc3ce%40sdc-v-sessmgr02; Matt Qvortrup, "The History of Ethno-National Referendums 1791-
2011," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics18, no. 1 (March 2012): 129-150, doi:10.1080/13537113.2012.654081.  
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processes, and not for separation as it is usually the case today.2 This function continued to be 
the prevalent one during the mid-nineteenth century in which there were a total of 43 
referendums held with 22 of them related to creating the Swiss confederation in 1848 after a civil 
war has occurred.3 The other 21 referendums were for the unification and creation of modern 
Italy in 1848.4  With the end of WWI, there were around 26 referendums that dealt with the 
redrawing of borders. These referendums were held in the backdrop of President Wilson’s 
doctrine of self-determination and post-Versailles settlements. All referendums were 
concentrated in Europe except for two referendums in the Ottoman Empire.5 These referendums 
were held in the years 1919-1923 with other ones held in 1935 and 1938. The logic behind these 
referendums was integrative with only a few cases of separation.  
The next wave was during the context of decolonization after WWII, with around 143 
referendums held.6 This time the referendums were not concentrated in Europe anymore but in 
places such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These were independence referendums held in 
European colonies. The main logic is separation and disintegration from their colonial rulers. 
After the decolonization era, the were various referendums held for secession or autonomy, with 
its peak in the 1970s. These referendums are usually ignored when discussing the history of 
referendums since most jump from WWII to the 1990s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Most of the referendums in the 1970s followed the logic of secession. There was the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands referendum held in 1975 in order to gain independence from the 
 
2 Mendez and Germann, “Contested Sovereignty.” 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.; Baogang He, "Referenda as a Solution to the National-Identity/Boundary Question: An Empirical Critique of 
the Theoretical Literature," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no. 1 (2002): 67-97, 
doi:10.1177/030437540202700103.  
5 Matt Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=3442334.       
6 Mendez and Germann, “Contested Sovereignty.” 
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U.S.7 There was also an attempted devolution of Scotland in 1979, and the Basque and Catalonia 
holding referendums calling for greater autonomy also in 1979. Another major referendum was 
held in 1980 when Quebec voted to secede from Canada.  
The final wave that set the stage for the referendums that are being held today is the fall 
of the Soviet Union. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a domino 
effect of independence referendums with their peak from 1990-1993. The referendums were held 
in former Soviet Republics. The main logic behind these referendums was disintegration, with a 
few cases of merging to other countries which constituted around 10 percent of all the cases 
during that time.8 Other devolution referendums were held again in 1997 by the Welsh and 
Scotland. In the 2000s, more referendums were held in Latin America. There was also the wave 
of substate partitions such as Jura’s separation from Berne in Switzerland. Other successful cases 
of secession referendums include Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia in 1993, East Timor’s 
separation from Indonesia in 1999, South Sudan’s separation from Sudan in 2011, and the most 
recent referendum on independence held on the 23rd of November 2019 in Bougainville. There 
are also upcoming referendums regarding independence/secession such as the Palawan partition 
plebiscite in the Philippines which is to be held on May 11, 2020, and New Caledonia will be 
holding their second independence referendum on September 6, 2020 while the last chance for 
another independence vote will be held in 2022.  
Just because there has been a plethora of cases on self-determination referendums does 
not mean that it does not come with its obstacles and difficulties. The holding of a referendum is 
 
7 Matt Qvortrup, "Voting on Independence and National Issues: A Historical and Comparative Study of 
Referendums on Self-Determination and Secession," French Journal of British Studies XX, no. 2 (2015): 1-12, 
doi:10.4000/rfcb.366.   
8 Mendez and Germann, “Contested Sovereignty.” 
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still a very contentious issue, especially when it comes to the determination of the future of a 
territory, especially since one would believe that forming decisions on partition could lead to the 
recurrence of violence and even aggravate the issue. However, there have been many studies that 
discussed the importance of forming a ‘well designed’ negotiated settlement that includes the 
provision of a referendum9. This is because it is more effective in the amelioration of violence 
and conflict rather than unilateral declarations of independence, or awaiting a military victory of 
either party.10 Therefore, a prevalent argument is that one of the most effective forms of conflict 
resolution when facing issues of secessionist claims, is to pursue the formation of a negotiated 
settlement with various provisions, including the provision of a referendum. However, this does 
not mean that one should ignore other factors that could be the cause of the success or failure of 
the referendum leading to a durable peaceful post-conflict environment. One of the main factors 
is the climate and context of the civil war, such as its intensity, number of warring parties, and 
ripeness. Another important factor to be considered is the process of the negotiations that lead to 
the formation of a peace settlement.  Finally, the degree of third-party involvement especially the 
UN in the formation and implementation of the peace agreement, in particular, the provision of 
the referendum needs assessing.  
1. Research Questions/ Hypothesis   
The principle of territorial integrity remains one of the most important principles in the 
international community and it is interesting to see how this is challenged with the increasing 
number of new states being born from sovereignty referendums where in the 20th century most 
 
9 Ramzi Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 31, no. 2 (April 2014): 193-217, doi:10.1177/0738894213501133; Virginia Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? 
Agreements and the Durability of Peace," International Orgnization 57, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 341, 
doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808760.023.  
10 Ibid.  
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new states used referendums to determine their independence11.  In contemporary international 
politics, the main reason why the topic of referendums is very relevant and important relates to 
the growing interest in using referendums as part of peace settlements. It is also very interesting 
and important to see how referendums, which are considered a democratic process and tool are 
even allowed or held in countries with no democratic institutions in place and how such a 
democratic tool is a result of dreadful long years of civil wars. Moreover, the conflict resolution 
study is always looking for the best tools that can bring out the most peaceful and best outcomes 
when trying to find solutions for conflicts. Especially when it comes to conflicts over territory 
where there is so much at risk therefore, is considered to be one of the most difficult conflicts to 
resolve since it usually entails other issues like ethnicity and natural resources.  
Although this kind of study is highly context based, it is important to learn from the 
failures and successes of certain cases and adopt them in a way that can be applied to several 
other cases with similar contexts and factors at play. This could give us some insight into state 
formation as a result of a referendum that acts as a form of an effective tool that leads to 
successful cases of durable peace. Moreover, as mentioned above, there are around two 
referendums on territory issues that will be held this year and others in upcoming years which 
makes this research relevant. I expect this research to supplement and enhance the conflict 
resolution literature relating to state formation and secession movements in the 20th – 21st 
centuries. This research will be based on answering one main question and two sub questions:  
Question 1: What effect does the inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the 
likelihood of a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory?  
 
11 Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict.  
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Hypothesis 1: The inclusion of a provision for a postponed referendum is an effective stipulation 
that serves as a costly signal which results in a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over 
territory.   
Question 1.1: Does a referendum serve as a costly signal of intent?   
Hypothesis 1.1:  The provision of a referendum serves as an assurance/incentive to commit 
warring parties to the peace process which reduces the commitment issues and makes for such a 
desirable and anticipated result of a negotiated settlement which results in a more durable 
agreement. The holding of a referendum increases the legitimacy of a secession movement since 
it is the people of concern that are voting on the issue of the future of their territory, which 
increases the likelihood of its acceptance by the state and the international world. 
Question 1.2: What is the role of timing in the implementation of a referendum?  
Hypothesis 1.2: Having a provision for a postponed referendum on secession increases the 
likelihood of a durable peace. When the holding of the referendum is postponed to a later stage, 
there is time given to both the people and the state to reconcile after long years of conflict. 
Moreover, this gives the opportunity to the state to attempt to persuade the seceding party to 
consider unity or autonomy. This time also allows the seceding party to develop their own 
methods and institutions to run their own territory should they achieve independence. This leads 
to a better result and can therefore, lead to a peaceful and successful post-conflict transition 
within five years. However, if a referendum is held too early there is a higher likelihood of 
recurrence of a conflict. 
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1.1 Case Selection 
The research seeks to trace the effect of a promised referendum in a negotiated settlement 
on the likelihood of peace or recurrence of conflict within the five years after the signing of the 
peace negotiated settlement. These questions will be answered by examining three dynamic 
cases of civil wars based on territorial issues; namely Bougainville, South Sudan, and East 
Timor. The particular peace agreements that will be examined are, the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement (BPA) signed in 2001, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 
2005, and the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the 
question of East Timor signed in 1999. The cases are very different in many ways in terms of 
their history, context, intensity of violence, peace process, and negotiated settlement. Another 
important aspect of the use of these cases is that there have not been any sources that have 
examined these three specific cases in comparison with each other and if they were mentioned in 
the same literature they were mentioned mostly as examples. Moreover, according to 
international law, each of these cases fit in very different categories of self-determination. They 
vary in the legitimacy of the plight to self-determination.  
The case of East Timor was clear cut, where they are guaranteed a right to self-
determination in international law as a former colony. The UN recognized East Timor as a non-
self-governing territory that has the right to self-determination as early as 1960. This was also 
cemented further after Indonesia occupied East Timor in 1975. As for South Sudan, according to 
international law it was seen as a remedial case of secession since this was seen as the only 
solution possible after a long-civil war that did not seem to be ending anytime soon. As for the 
Bougainville case, it’s a little vague on whether Bougainville had a right to self-determination. 
There was the issue with Bougainville where it was in between remedial secession and right to 
13 
 
secession since there were doubts if they consisted of a distinctive people, also there was some 
form of federal arrangements with local governance as well as representation in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). Hence, one can see that these are very diverse cases in international law 
perspective, and despite these great differences they all had the same result of a peaceful post-
conflict environment due to the inclusion of a referendum in a negotiated settlement. The 
referendum operates similarly in providing a stronger guarantee to peace than not having a 
referendum in different settings. Hence, other cases of secession were not included especially 
ones with that did not have a referendum all together in a negotiated settlement since the main 
premise of the thesis is to show its important effect in variant situations, contexts, conflicts etc. 
Moreover, an important variation is also the timing of the holding of the referendum in which 
Bougainville’s referendum was held after fifteen years of the signing of the agreement, South 
Sudan’s referendum held after six years of the signing of the agreement and finally East Timor’s 
referendum held only a few months after the signing of the agreement.   
However, what they share is that the three cases have gone through a civil war which 
resulted in a peace agreement that includes the provision of a promised referendum. Moreover, in 
all of the cases, the referendums have already been held and both South Sudan and East Timor 
are now member states of the UN, except for Bougainville since their referendum was only held 
at the end of last year. This makes the case of Bougainville the most interesting since its post-
conflict environment was the most peaceful despite the postponement of their referendum to 10-
15 years. Furthermore, both South Sudan and Bougainville have natural resources that have been 
abused by their parent states, which is one of the main reasons for their claims to secession. 
South Sudan has oil as the main natural resource and Bougainville has the Panguna copper mine. 
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All cases have underlying issues of ethnicity as a result of the colonial legacy that played out 
after the decolonization of the parent states.  
Additionally, in all cases, the regional states and organizations have played an important 
role either during the peace process or after the signing of the negotiated settlement. For 
example, Australia played an important role in both cases of East Timor and Bougainville for 
varying reasons while the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was the main 
mediator in the Sudan issue. The UN has also played a role in all cases with varying degrees of 
involvement ranging from acting as a monitoring group to taking over the government functions 
of a territory. Moreover, both Bougainville and East Timor have made unilateral declarations for 
secession but to no avail and their independence and the ending of the conflict were only 
possible after the promise of a referendum that was stipulated in a negotiated settlement.  
2. Methodological Approaches  
The main research design of the paper is a comparative study approach of most-different 
cases. The reason why this project focuses on specific case studies is because, in the study of 
civil wars, one cannot reach generalized conclusions simply on the basis of theoretical 
deductions since each case has different factors that amount to the same result. In the most-
different case, the dependent variable i.e. a successful post-conflict environment should be 
constant and similar among the three cases especially when a research question is inductive.12 
This is especially true since the research questions call for an inductive approach, seeking to 
explain and illustrate the effect that a promised referendum in a negotiated settlement has on the 
likelihood of the success and evasion of the recurrence of conflict within the five years after the 
 
12 Carsten Anckar, "On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems 
Design in Comparative Research," International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, no. 5 (November 5, 
2008): 389-401, doi:10.1080/13645570701401552.  
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signing of the peace settlement. The thesis will examine how these cases have the same outcome 
i.e. a successful post-conflict environment five years after the signing of the peace settlement, 
due to the existence of provisions namely a referendum.  
Most of the sources will be secondary sources, where the authors were present during the 
peace process and its implementation such as Ian Martin who served as Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General for the East Timor popular consultation. Two main databases will be 
utilized in the examination of these cases namely the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on 
armed conflicts and peace agreements and the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM). The PAM provides 
quantitative and qualitative data on the degree of implementation of Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between 1989-2012. It also has a detailed account of every provision in an agreement 
along with a detailed description of steps that were taken to implement them, as long with the 
obstacles that they were faced with.13 The UCDP will be mainly used for the definitions of 
variables, while the PAM will be used in the chapters of each case to refer to the main provision 
of the agreements as well as examine the referendum’s implementation.   
2.1 Independent Variables 
The thesis treats the independent variables as root causes that affected the cases and the 
analysis and not as direct causes. These variables will be taken into account in order to see how 
there are certain root causes and factors that can let us know how and why such an outcome i.e. 
successful peaceful transitions occurred in the cases of Bougainville, Sudan, and East Timor. 
These variables will not be explicitly mentioned in the thesis; however, they (UCDP and PAM 
variables) were used to help with the selection of the case studies examined in the thesis.  
Generally, the empirical analysis in the thesis will take into account these research frameworks. 
 
13 "Home | Peace Accords Matrix," Home | Peace Accords Matrix, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/.  
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For example, the Stedman variables that will be discussed below are mentioned implicitly when 
analyzing the difficulty that the peace processes were facing. Likewise, the peace process 
variables as well as peace agreement variables, will be indirectly mentioned when describing and 
explaining the peace process of each case and its outcome in forming a peace agreement. Finally, 
the most important variable that will be focused on which is the main premise of the whole thesis 
is the referendum variable that will also be discussed further below.   
One of the variables that will be used to explain this outcome are the conflict variables 
which are: intensity, and nature of a conflict that lead to a certain peace process. However, 
before defining these variables a definition on what constitutes an armed conflict must be 
defined. According to the UCDP, an armed conflict is when there is the use of armed force 
between two parties in which one of them must be the government of a state that results in at 
least 25 battle deaths in a year.  
This number of battle deaths is the minimum threshold to categorize a conflict as an 
armed conflict. This brings us to the definition of one of the main conflict variables which is 
intensity. According to the UCDP, there are three categories of intensity: minor where at least 25 
battle-deaths per year but less than 1,000 battle-related deaths throughout the course of the 
conflict, war where there at least 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict and 
finally, not active where there are less than 25 battle related deaths per year.  As for the 
definition of the nature of the conflict, an armed conflict is usually about an incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory. The incompatibility concerning government is one in 
which the issue is the political system where the central government is either replaced or its 
composition changed. As for the incompatibility in territory, it concerns the status of a specific 
territory for example secession or autonomy. There are also other kinds of variables suggested by 
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Stedman that can help us assess the difficulty of the environment of the conflict.14Some of these 
are: (1) the number of warring parties, when if there are more than two warring parties the 
degree of difficulty is higher; (2) the likelihood of spoilers; (3) disposable natural resources 
where if warring parties have access to disposable resources they provide them with a means to 
continue to fight and is used as a leverage and an issue of continuing the behavior of a spoiler. 
Although he lists more than these, the listed variables seem to be the best and most relevant ones 
that can be applied to the cases that will be examined by the thesis.  
As for the peace process variable, this thesis differentiates between competitive, mixed 
and cooperative processes.15 These processes are defined in several ways whether the parties at 
the negotiating table were seeking a zero sum game emphasizing absolute gains or, there was a 
mix of both integrative and distributive strategies finally, “… whether they primarily exchange 
concessions or share information about their interests and needs (Kressel et al., 1994).”16 A sub-
variable to the peace process variable is the degree of the involvement of a third party and their 
effect on the peace process and settlement. The negotiation variables are to a large extent 
affected by the context and intensity of a conflict. The intensity, context and environment of a 
conflict sets the whole tone for how a negotiation process and type of settlement is shaped.  
The other independent variables that will be used as an explanatory variable are the peace 
agreement variables – namely, the type of agreement and the peace process. According to the 
UCDP, there are various types of peace agreements namely, full, partial, and peace process 
agreements. The full agreement is defined as an agreement where the whole incompatibility is 
 
14 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5-53, 
doi:10.2307/2539366.  
15 Cynthia Irmer, and Daniel Druckman, "Explaining Negotiation Outcomes: Process or Context?" Negotiation and 
Conflict Management Research 2, no. 3 (2009): 227, doi:10.1111/j.1750-4716.2009.00038.x.  
16 Ibid, 211.  
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settled between one or several dyads.17 This definition is very similar to that of the 
comprehensive agreement used in the PAM where an agreement is comprehensive when, “…. 
(1) the major parties to the conflict were involved in the negotiations that led to the written 
agreement; and (2) the substantive issues underlying the conflict were included in the 
negotiations.”18 The second type of peace agreement in the categorization of the UCDP is a 
partial agreement where only some parts of the incompatibility were settled by one or several 
dyads. Finally, a peace process agreement is where there is an agreement on the initiation of a 
process with the aim of reaching a settlement on the incompatibilities concerning one or several 
dyads.   
 Another major peace agreement variable is the inclusion of a provision for a postponed 
referendum. The referendum and in specific a sovereignty referendum is defined as, “a direct 
popular vote which involves a major reallocation of sovereign rights over a given territorial 
entity between at least two territorial centres.”19 The provision of the referendum is a constant 
variable in all the cases, however with varying degrees of timings, designs etc. Each of the cases 
held their referendums in varying timings as mentioned above in the case selectin section. What 
will also be taken into consideration are the conditions or lack of that are attached to the holding 
of the referendum. This allows us to see how both the timing and conditions attached to the 
referendum can either have a positive or negative effect on the likelihood of a lasting peace after 
a settlement in conflicts over territory.  
 
17 "Definitions." Department of Peace and Conflict Research, https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.  
18 "Home | Peace Accords Matrix," Home | Peace Accords Matrix, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/.  
19 Mendez and Germann, “Contested Sovereignty,” 7.  
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 2.2 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable, is the success of the peace process or transition within 5 years 
after the signing of the negotiated settlement. It is understandable that this could be seen as short-
sighted however, there are many scholars and literatures that have used the five-year threshold as 
a measuring variable.20 Even through statistical results, it was evident that the critical period 
following a peace agreement ends by the fourth year.21 It is difficult to define what does 
‘success’ mean especially when it comes to cases with very different contexts and environment. 
There are various different standards of what peace or success is in the field of conflict 
resolution. The thesis will be adopting a minimalist standard of success/peace in which the 
definition of the failure of peace is, “…the recurrence of internal armed conflict where a prior 
civil war is widely perceived to have ended.”22 The main reason for choosing this minimalist 
definition is because the focus of the thesis is to illustrate the effectiveness of the referendum as 
a tool that increases the likelihood of peace; where there is no recurrence of violence at least to 
the level of intensity that it has experienced in the conflict before the signing of the negotiated 
settlement. The thesis is focused on the recurrence or non-recurrence of violence between the 
parties of the settlement itself. This does not mean that I would be excluding that there would be 
violence within the party that secedes which was the case for South Sudan with the current civil 
war that it is going through. However, since the premise of the thesis is the referendum and the 
 
20 Ibid.; Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An 
Investigation of Some Key Variables," International Organization 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 183-208, 
doi:10.1162/002081801551450.; Stefan Wolff, "The Making of Peace: Processes and Agreements," Armed Conflict 
Survey 4, no. 1 (2018): 65-80, doi:10.1080/23740973.2018.1482065. 
21 Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements.” 
22 Charles T. Call, “Introduction: The Tragedy of Civil War Recurrence,” in Why Peace Fails: The Causes and 
Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, 8, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012.   
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peace agreements between warring parties, the peace that is examined in the thesis specifically 
looks at the peace between the warring the parties and not within them.   
3. Chapter Structure of Thesis  
 The next chapter will be introducing the main theoretical framework of the thesis, which 
is the deliberative democratic theory. The chapter will also include a literature review, in which 
it will explore some of the main arguments that have been discussed and research done on the 
subject of referendums. The theory/literature review chapter will be followed by the three 
separate chapter where each case study will be discussed and examined.  
 The Bougainville chapter will start out with a background in which we will examine how 
issues regarding the Panguna Mine, were the main issues that resulted in the eruption of a civil 
war that lasted around 13 years with PNG. The chapter will also examine the windows of 
opportunities and ripeness in the conflict that lead to the initiation of a peace process. The peace 
process will also be examined including all the pre-negotiations and reconciliation processes that 
Bougainvilleans went through amongst each other. Later the main negotiation between 
Bougainville and Papua New Guinea (PNG) will be explored on the issue of the referendum, and 
the regional intervention by Australia that broke the deadlock in the negotiations and led to the 
formation and signing of the BPA in 2001. This will be followed by a look at the implementation 
history of the five years after the signing of the BPA in order to see the post-conflict peace that 
Bougainville has experienced due to the referendum provision.   
The Sudan chapter will also have a similar structure to the Bougainville chapter where it 
will start with background information to see the struggle of South Sudan towards independence 
dating back to Sudan’s independence from England in the 1950s. This is what caused Sudan to 
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go through two separate civil wars with the last one ending in 2005 the same year Sudan’s  CPA. 
The peace processes that occurred after each of the civil wars will be discussed starting from the 
creation of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 1994 to the Machakos Protocol in 2004 to the 
CPA in 2005. The ripeness and windows of opportunities will also be discussed here including 
the importance of the IGAD as well as the international world especially the Troika (U.S., U.K., 
Norway) in the formation of the CPA. Finally, the chapter will explore the implementation of the 
referendum in 2011 as well as some of the obstacles that it faced in its organization during the 5 
years after the signing of the CPA.  
The last case study that will be explored is East Timor, in which the background will 
explain what led Indonesia to occupy and annex it in 1975. The role of the UN and the 
international community was very present from the very start after their condemnation of the 
occupation, leading up to the UN being one of the major parties and signatories of the 
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of 
East Timor in 1999. The UN was given the responsibility to organize and implement the 
referendum, and eventually was the de facto ruler of East Timor until they gained independence. 
The chapter will illustrate the downfalls of a rushed agreement and referendum which was held 
only after a few months of the signing of the agreement.    
The final chapter will be the conclusion chapter where the main question of the thesis and 
its sub-questions will be answered by comparing and contrasting the three cases explored. The 
chapter will illustrate the importance of the provision of the referendum and how it increased the 
likelihood of post-conflict peace in all cases regardless of the difference of contexts, 
geographies, and timing of implementation. Other factors such as the importance of third-party 
interventions (regional or UN), pressures whether internal or external that lead to windows of 
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opportunities and even the importance of certain individuals such as state leaders or mediators 
will be discussed as well.    
 
Chapter 2- Literature Review and Theoretical framework 
 This chapter will discuss some of the major concepts and theories relating to referendums 
that are held on issues regarding territory. The concepts and theories will be organized according 
to the category of variables under which they fall within the framework of this thesis. The 
chapter starts off with the concept of “sovereignty referendum”, which is the intervening 
variable, and will be followed by defining what peace is and what a durable peace entails, which 
is the dependent variable. Later the concepts and theories that will be discussed are, peace 
agreement theory, process/ context/ sequence of negotiation, third party involvement and 
monitoring, and Power Parity, all of which are treated by this thesis as independent variables. 
Finally, the main theoretical frameworks of the thesis – upon which my hypotheses are based – 
will be discussed, including the deliberative democratic theory and the concepts of costly signal, 
legitimacy, and timing /time pressure.   
1. Independent Variable Concepts  
1.1 Sovereignty Referendum (Independent variable)  
The focus of this thesis is referendums held over issues of territory. The main concept 
that relates to issues of territory is the claim to secession. Although there are varying definitions 
of secession from different academics, Peter Radan provides us with a broad definition of 
secession that can be applicable to a diverse set of secession cases. He defines secession as “the 
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creation of a new state upon territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an 
existing state…extends secession beyond unilateral secession.”23  
Hence, the referendums that are held over territory issues and claims of secession is 
known as a sovereignty referendum. A sovereignty referendum is defined as, “a direct popular 
vote which involves a major reallocation of sovereign rights over a given territorial entity 
between at least two territorial centres.”24 Various types of sovereignty referendums with 
different purposes and functions are listed by Sen in his book Sovereignty Referendums in 
International and Constitutional Law.25 These include: (1) Accession and Border in which an 
accession referendum is the vote on the incorporation of a region into a state. As for the border 
referendum, its purpose is to resolve territorial disputes between two states. (2) Unification 
referendum is employed when there is a merging of more than one entity into a separate state. (3) 
Status referendums are utilized in a decolonization context.  (4) Transfer of Sovereignty 
referendum is employed to vote on the transfer of sovereignty on the supranational or sub-
national level. An example of a supranational referendum is the integration of European 
countries in the EU. As for the subnational level, “may be found mostly in the constitutions of 
federal states that specify the legal framework of territorial alterations or division of federal units 
into one or two separate parts.”26 Finally, (4) independence in which referendums are employed 
to question the secession of territory or not. There are three different subcategories for 
independence referendums on territory: (i) De facto unilateral secession, (ii) De jure referendums 
 
23 Radan, "Secessionist Referenda.”   
24Mendez and Germann, “Contested Sovereignty.” 
25 Ilker Gokhan Sen, Sovereignty Referendums in International and Constitutional Law, Springer International 
Publishing Switzerland, 2015. 
26 Ibid, 66.  
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held in territories subject to decolonization (iii) De jure referendums not held in the colonial 
context, and are specified in a negotiated settlement or constitution of the central state. 
1.2 Peace Agreement Theory  
Before discussing the peace agreement theory, a definition for a peace agreement should 
be provided. The definition that will be used is based on the one applied by the UCDP – “a 
consensual contract between some or all conflict protagonists to settle all or part of the 
incompatibility and regulate future interaction, with a view to ending armed conflict… it is the 
overall contract that emerges gradually from the peace process. … regardless of the duration of 
the peace process, as long as the final act in the peace process confirms these accords and puts 
them into effect.”27 There has been literature on the importance of the inclusion of certain 
provisions such as a referendum to develop a ‘well-designed’ peace agreement which is more 
effective in the amelioration of violence and conflict rather than to wait for a military victory.28 
Therefore, the most ideal form of conflict resolution when facing issues of secessionist claims, is 
to pursue the formation of a negotiated settlement with various provisions, including the 
provision of a referendum. Hence, the design of the peace settlement and the provisions/ 
guarantees that are included are important factors to consider when assessing a peace settlement 
itself and its outcomes whether it was successful or not. In his article, Badran has set out to 
illustrate first of all that there is more durable and swifter peace when there is a peace negotiation 
settlement than a military victory. Furthermore, he emphasizes through statistical evidence that, 
“the design quality of the peace agreement has a statistically significant impact on halting armed 
conflict recurrence… A well-designed agreement leads to durable peace, whereas a poorly 
 
27 Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements,” 194. 
28 Ibid.  
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designed agreement is tantamount to a haphazard termination of fighting.”29 Badran even goes 
on to suggest a peace agreement theory that argues that the design of the peace agreement can 
have a great significance and effect on omitting the issue of the commitment problem that most 
civil wars are riddled with. The theory suggests that a well-designed agreement can encourage 
cooperative interaction between the signatories which serves to institutionalize peace.30  Fortna 
also discusses the significance of the design, content, and provisions in an agreement although 
she is focusing more on ceasefires, this can also be applied to negotiated settlements.31  
Other scholars emphasize the importance of the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in 
which a referendum is one these forms. From previous studies by Hoddie, Hartzell, and 
Rothchild implementation of military and territory provisions are the most important and has a 
positive impact in reducing the risk of recurring conflict, unlike focusing on the implementation 
of the political provisions.32 Walter, on the other hand, argues that political provisions actually 
do have great significance with implementation.33 Furthermore, Walter does not see that military 
provisions are important but the territorial ones are more important. The main reasoning behind 
this statement is because, “the implementation of territorial pacts entails larger and less 
retractable costs than the implementation of political pacts.”34 However, one cannot assess a 
peace agreement or its provisions without retracing the negotiation process and events that lead 
to the formation of a negotiated settlement.    
 
29 Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements,” 204.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Fortna, "Scraps of Paper?” 
32Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace”; Anna K. Jarstad, and Desiree Nilsson, "From Words to 
Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords," Conflict Management and Peace Science25, 
no. 3 (2008): 206-223, doi:10.1080/07388940802218945.  
33 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002. 
34 Jarstad and Nilsson, "From Words to Deeds,” 211.  
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1.3 Process/ Context/ Sequence of negotiation  
By retracing the negotiation process, one can understand why certain provisions were 
included and why some were not. A peace process is defined as a, “process towards a non-
military solution sought by the respective parties to a conflict, often supported by international 
involvement.”35 The retracing of the peace process could help us understand how the referendum 
provision carried so much weight of importance during the negotiation process for the seceding 
party, and how problematic it was for the parent state. One must not ignore the importance of the 
relationship between the peace/negotiation process and the outcome.36 There is even literature 
that associates the commitment problem (voluntary and involuntary), and its emergence in events 
that are taking place during the process or the trajectory that the peace process is taking.37 
Hence, it is important to take into consideration the sequence of events in a peace process 
that lead to the materialization of the provisions, which are eventually drawn up together to form 
a negotiated settlement. The most critical component and focal point of a peace process is the 
making of a peace agreement38. This provides us an outcome which can be used to retrace the 
different stages and steps of a peace process and will enhance our understanding of the process’s 
relation to the outcome. In fact, a solution to avoid the pluralism problem that most of the civil 
wars are riddled with is the proper sequencing of the formation of a negotiated settlement at first 
before a referendum is held.39 While referendums are becoming normative in the creation of new 
states, they also can result in electoral violence or can be considered as just freezing a conflict 
 
35 Wolff, “The Making of Peace.” 
36 Irmer and Druckman, "Explaining Negotiation Outcomes.” 
37 Wakako Maekawa, Barış Arı, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, "UN Involvement and Civil War Peace Agreement 
Implementation," Public Choice 178, no. 3-4 (2018): 397-416, doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0602-9.  
38 Wolff, “The Making of Peace.” 
39 Stephen Tierney, Reflections on Referendums, (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2018), 16, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/reflections-on-referendums.pdf.  
27 
 
that is prone to return to war and conflict once again.40 Hence, the factor of timing and sequence 
of implementation is very important to consider which will be further discussed in the theoretical 
framework section.  
Another factor that could affect the peace process and its outcome is the context that it is 
playing out in. The contexts in which the peace processes are being enacted in can set the whole 
tone and outcome. 41 The context explanation also elaborates on the characteristics of the 
different parties that were involved in the civil war, which will provide us a clearer explanation 
on the sequencing of events and how it led to a negotiated settlement that came to include a 
referendum as a provision. The idea of taking the context into consideration also allows us to 
factor in other explanations for the failure or success of a negotiated settlement or referendum 
and not blame it solely on the referendum; “… the “success” or “failure” of the referendum 
device depends on the wider political context rather than factors inherent to referendums.”42  The 
condition in which the referendum is first of all proposed and later on held in is very important to 
assess whether the referendum can be considered a ‘conflict amelioration tool’ as Lee and Mac 
Ginty claim.43 When one studies the kind of environment and context that the proposal of the 
referendum materialized in, one can understand the importance and weight that it carries in the 
making or breaking of the peace process when it comes to conflicts over territory.44 Another 
important factor to take into consideration when assessing a peace process, the negotiated 
 
40 Katherine Collin, "Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and 
Bougainville," Ethnopolitics18, no. 2 (2019): 139-157, doi:10.1080/17449057.2018.1513726. 
41 Wolff, “The Making of Peace.” 
42 Sung Yong Lee and Roger Mac Ginty, "Context and Postconflict Referendums," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 
18, no. 1 (2012): 59, doi:10.1080/13537113.2012.654085.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.; Wolff, “The Making of Peace.”  
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settlements and its provisions is third party guarantees that usually go hand in hand with the 
implementation of referendums in war-torn countries.    
1.4 Third-party involvement and monitoring  
Other than the significance of having a referendum provision in a peace settlement is the 
guarantee of the monitoring of a third party on the implementation of the settlement. Walter 
believes that it is insufficient to have power-sharing provisions without third party security 
guarantees to assist with the implementation.45 Peacekeeping and mediation help alleviate some 
of the issues of the commitment problem since it increases the costs of returning to war. With 
external intervention, you have the international community and especially the mediating country 
itself to deal with other than your main opponent. Accepting peacekeeping or mediation can also 
be seen as good intentions and a costly signal of intent (a concept that will be discussed further 
below) not to start conflict again; “Physical constraints, audience costs, and third-party 
guarantees or peacekeeping efforts change belligerents' incentives, but also serve as important 
signaling devices that can reduce uncertainty about intentions. Willingness to accept measures 
that make war more costly is a credible signal of benign intent.”46  
Third-party guarantors range from individual countries, regional powers, or international 
organizations. From the initial stages of the peace process, international assistance often has a 
great significance in getting the warring parties to the negotiating table in the first place. 
Therefore, when both parties trust this international assistance then having guarantees and 
provisions on their monitoring and aid in implementing a negotiated settlement helps the peace 
process to succeed; “By reducing risks to negotiators… they facilitate not only the conclusion of 
 
45 Walter, Committing to Peace.  
46 Fortna, "Scraps of Paper?”, 344.   
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peace agreements but also their implementation and operation, especially when international 
involvement is directed towards monitoring and verification, dispute resolution and an 
international military and/or civilian presence.”47 When there is international monitoring and 
implementing, especially when it comes to demilitarizing, the party that has to disarm will not 
feel like this is so much of a defeat, and therefore mitigate commitment problems, which can 
lead to the recurrence of violence.48  
Quantitative research has been produced on the significance of the promise of a third- 
party to enforce the settlement. In a study done by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rotchild, they were 
seeking to examine several variables in order to see which of them have the most significance in 
affecting the success of a peace settlement. The authors have come to the conclusion that, “…the 
inclusion of a third-party enforcer of the agreement reduces the hazard by an estimated 98 
percent.”49 Other literature have focused on the influence of international involvement in 
referendum cases in particular. There are two main factors that resulted in the peaceful cases of 
post-referendum environments. One of the factors is the involvement of the international 
community in the administering of the referendum which guarantees proper and fair conduct of 
the referendum and therefore the results whatever they may be, will be recognized thus adding to 
its legitimacy. The second factor is that the holding of the referendum was agreed upon and 
negotiated by both sides of the conflict.50 Therefore, at the end the most ideal kind of peace 
process and negotiated settlement to ensure its success is the combination of a good design of a 
 
47 Wolff, “The Making of Peace,” 70.  
48 Maekawa, Ari, and Gizelis, "UN Involvement and Civil War”; Stefan Wolff, "From Paper to Peace: The Role of 
Guarantees in Peace Agreements," World Politics Review. December 17, 2013. Accessed April 08, 2019. 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13444/from-paper-to-peace-the-role-of-guarantees-in-peace-
agreements. 
49 Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace.” 
50 Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict.   
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peace agreement with important provisions, a well-thought-out sequence on implementation, and 
finally the involvement of international power; “…there appears to be both consensus and 
evidence that the design of peace agreements (i.e., the provisions that they contain) maters; that 
implementation and its sequencing are important; and that international involvement more often 
than not is a feature of sustainable peace that flows from negotiated agreements.”51 
1.5 Power Parity 
One must also account to the power dynamics in a conflict since merely signing an 
agreement and agreeing on its provisions does not necessarily mean that the commitment 
problem and conflict are resolved. The change in the dynamics of power can bring back violence 
depending on which side’s power has increased or decreased; “This argument thus suggests that 
the risks of recur- rent conflict increase if either belligerent experiences a change in leadership, 
especially if that change is rapid or unexpected.”52 The issue of power in a civil war, “…does not 
concern the balance of power but how long each belligerent can fight.”53 Hultquist lists three 
levels of power dynamics; (1) extreme asymmetry (2) parity (3) rebel superiority.54  
When there is an extreme asymmetry between the powers of the rebels and the 
government it makes the cost of the war less for the government. Hence, the government will 
have little incentive to enter into negotiation especially since a negotiation could legitimize the 
rebels. As for the level of parity the rebels are established to be a legitimate threat to the 
government. This demonstrates to the government that the rebels have a greater probability of 
victory. Hence, negotiation and settlement are seen as a viable option by the government since 
 
51 Wolff, “The Making of Peace,” 66. 
52 Suzanne Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and 
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53 Philip Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement,” Journal of 
Peace Research 50, no. 5 (September 2013): 624, doi:10.1177/0022343313486281.  
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the rebels are an imminent threat and in almost equal power; “Fighting near parity has 
informational value to each side, which can expose information about relative strength and how 
long each side can hold out…gives both sides an incentive to find an appropriate settlement or 
pursue a ceasefire.”55 
Finally, there is the level of rebel superiority in which the rebels are stronger and on a 
higher level of power compared to the government. This type of power parity happens in rare 
cases, but when it happens it is more detrimental to a government than a weak rebel since the 
government cannot hide and practice hit and run tactics utilized by weak rebels. In this type of 
situation, the rebels might not want to settle when they have greater power to their advantage. 
Therefore, peace settlements are less likely when rebels are stronger. However, this creates even 
more incentive for governments to concede to the rebels’ demands and accepting provisions that 
are greatly costly on their behalf such as power-sharing, referendums, and third-party guarantees.  
2. Success, Peace and Durability (Dependent Variable)  
Defining the success of a post-conflict environment is very difficult since there are so 
many different standards of success that are applied according to the study or explanation that is 
being sought. Another reason why it is difficult to define what a ‘successful settlement’ is  
because, “…a settlement is a complex and multifaceted outcome of a process, and arises from 
particular circumstances.”56 Some scholars believe that in order to label a settlement as 
‘successful’, it should produce an arrangement which can be resilient and long-lasting, while 
others are satisfied with the idea that as long as it achieves the initial expectations then that is 
 
55 Ibid, 633.  
56 Jorge Mestre-Jorda, “Are There Formulas for Successful Diplomatic Agreements?” European View 15, no. 2 
(2016): 335, doi:10.1007/s12290-016-0421-7.  
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more than enough for it to be considered ‘successful’. There is also the issue of defining what 
peace is or at least what is the standard of peace that one is seeking.   
The most common definition of peace that is used by most scholars is negative peace.57 
Negative peace is known as the absence of armed conflict, meaning the non-recurrence of an 
armed conflict after a civil war has ended which is the definition that is utilized in the thesis as 
already mentioned in the introduction. However, one cannot also ignore the ‘positive’ peace 
concept which looks at the long-term success and durability of peace after a civil war.58 
Durability of peace is considered to be a combination of both negative and positive peace where 
in order to assess whether durability of peace is possible after a conflict it has to start with the 
absence of violence (negative) and only then can the development of a state can begin (positive); 
“Building on the peace agreement literature, the elements of durable peace include indicators of 
conflict management as well as positive (improving quality of life) and negative (improved 
security) peace…”59  
However, assessment of the durability of peace is not as simple as assessing negative 
peace since, “Durable peace is a complex, multidimensional concept that includes both conflict 
resolving (reconciliation) and institutional (security, governance and economic) building during 
the post-agreement period.”60 Some factors that are usually taken into consideration when 
evaluating the durability of a peace agreement are, the development of security institutions; was 
 
57 Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements”; Fortna, "Scraps of Paper?”; Karl Derouen et al., “Civil War Peace 
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362169.  
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there the integration of rebels in the military, was there police reform, demobilization, and 
disarmament of rebels, etc.61 There is also the factor of governance institutions in terms of how 
well and effective was the implementation of power-sharing arrangements and development of 
governance systems in the territory or in general the effective implementation of provisions that 
were stipulated in the peace settlement.62 Governance factors also entail whether there have been 
any constitutional changes or electoral reform. As for in the economic factor, did the standard of 
living improve, were there policies and plans for development of the economy set, etc.63 
Although these factors are important to take into consideration when assessing the degree of 
success of a case, however when it comes to territories that have been war-torn for as long as 10-
20 years of civil war, even if some of these factors were not achieved immediately or not yet this 
does not mean you can label a case as a failure in peace. Hence, most of the scholars use the 
negative peace definition the most, since it is a great achievement in any territory that went 
through a long peace process and an even longer civil war.    
3. Theoretical Framework 
 After explaining some of the literature regarding the variables that are taken into 
consideration in the assessment of the case studies, this chapter will now move to the theoretical 
frameworks and concepts that are the main base of my hypotheses. The concepts and theories are 
the deliberative democratic theory, costly signal, legitimacy, and finally time. Each of these 
concepts will be discussed in detail further below. However, I would like to first illustrate how 
these concepts prove the importance of the different aspects and nature of a referendum in a 
negotiated settlement which all support the hypothesis of the thesis discussed in the introduction. 
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The combination of these concepts when applied to a referendum can illustrate how and why 
referendums have a positive effect on the likelihood of durable peace. 
The deliberative democratic theory sheds a light on the importance of political inclusion 
or in the case of civil wars over territory, the importance of the people in the contested territory 
to have their voice heard in the decision that is being made on the future of their own territory. 
Moreover, it also illustrates the importance of value-deliberation when negotiating a peace 
settlement; since only when the roots of the issue that resulted in a civil war are discussed and 
settled through provisions stipulated in a peace agreement can it increase the likelihood of peace. 
Hence, in a conflict over territory, the referendum can be seen as holding a significant ‘value’ in 
a negotiated settlement since it ultimately provides a final legitimate answer and decision on the 
future of the contested territory.  
This brings us to the legitimacy concept since official referendums stipulated in an 
official negotiated settlement ensures that this is what the people want. This particular concept 
concerns the nature of the referendum when it comes to its outcome. This is important also for 
the international community since they can accept a challenge to the principle of territorial 
integrity only when a referendum is stipulated in a formal negotiated settlement which gives 
legitimacy to the referendum and its outcome. Moreover, since a referendum holds a significant 
‘value’ it increases its legitimacy since it is the people of concern that will be making the 
decision on the future of their own territory. Additionally, the weight of legitimacy that the 
referendum carries helps ameliorate the commitment issue since breaching it or denying the 
results can be very costly and could lead to the recurrence of violence.  
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 Mistrust and commitment issues always are major obstacles during the peace process as 
well as after the signing of a peace settlement which can result in the recurrence of violence. 
Hence, what is needed in the peace process is a costly signal that is seen as a major concession in 
order to help gain the trust of the other party. The concept of costly signal when applied to a 
referendum is associated with the nature of the peace process; however, it does also illustrate 
some insight on the importance and costly weight that a referendum holds when it comes to its 
outcome since denying its results or denying its implementation can increase the likelihood of 
recurrence of violence. When the parent state allows for the stipulation of a referendum 
provision in an official negotiated settlement this is seen as a major concession and costly signal 
on behalf of the parent state. The parent state signals to the rebels and people of the territory that 
they are willing to accept the possible loss of territory in return for the costly signal of the rebels 
accepting to demilitarize and disarm. This increases the cost of breaching a negotiated 
settlement, which helps ameliorate the commitment issue and therefore increases the likelihood 
of durable peace. The durability of peace is also connected to the timing of implementation of a 
referendum in the cases of conflicts over territory.  
The concept of time, when applied to the referendum, focuses on the nature of the 
outcome of the holding of a referendum as well as insight on the post-conflict period that leads to 
the holding of the referendum. The holding of a referendum in a rushed and ad hoc manner can 
actually increase the likelihood of recurrence of violence. Usually when a referendum is 
postponed there are interim/autonomy periods which allow both parties (rebels and parent state) 
to first of all recuperate from the long years of war and second of all work on bettering their 




3.1 Deliberative democratic theory 
The main theory used for the explanation of the importance of a referendum is the 
deliberative democratic theory, specifically the value-deliberation concept discussed in Ron 
Levy’s article “Shotgun Referendums: Popular Deliberation and Constitutional Settlement in 
Conflict Societies.”64 Levy brings attention to a gap in the literature of deliberative theory that 
was always applied to peaceful nations and never applied to conflict-ridden nations. Levy uses 
the past theories and concepts on the deliberative process of the formation of a constitution in a 
democracy. Unlike most of the literature on deliberative democratic theory, he has illustrated the 
same concept specifically focusing on the deliberative values that can be applied to referendums 
held under ongoing or apprehended violence.  
Levy’s theory says that, “those subject to collective decisions should have voices in the 
decision-making process… focuses on achieving ‘overlapping consensus’… where citizens can 
find and share common ground despite differing worldviews.”65 The concept of a referendum 
corresponds with the main elements of this theory in which those who are the subjects of a 
certain decision should be the ones participating in the process of making this decision. This 
way, in a context with so many differences, the citizens can find a voice and reach some form of 
common ground. This theory used to explain the importance of the deliberation on important 
values meaning provisions such as a referendum in the formation of a constitution; nonetheless, 
the same explanations and concepts can be applied on a peace agreement. According to Levy, “It 
is possible that a settlement process focused on value-deliberation can aid settlement by 
encouraging the process to approximate public reason ideals more closely.”66 This emphasizes 
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the importance of ‘value-deliberation’ when negotiating a settlement or constitutional change 
since it is the discussion of important values (provisions) and underlying issues that will lead to 
peace and success. The ones that are only focused on enforcement fall short of looking at the 
important issues that should be discussed and included in a constitution or peace agreement. Not 
all types of provisions and implementations carry the same weight, but the ones that carry high 
costs are expected to increase the probability of durable peace.  
3.2 Costly Signal 
The commitment problem is known to be one of the main problems often discussed in the 
conflict resolution literature. The commitment problem is seen as one of the main obstacles in 
the negotiation process and settlement.67 Even when both parties do not want to fight anymore 
each side does not know the intentions of the other. Hence, there is an endless cycle of mistrust 
which, “… can undermine cooperation even where perfect information would automatically 
yield a co- operative outcome.”68  Once the rebels are asked to demilitarize in order to move to 
the process of negotiation, it is seen as a great disadvantage to them. One main strategy for the 
amelioration of the commitment problem is ‘costly signaling’. Costly signaling is the idea of the 
inclusion of certain guarantees and provisions provided and laid out in the peace agreements 
such as power-sharing territorial autonomy, referendums etc.; “Only costly signals can reassure 
the fighting parties in the absence of trust in institutional reforms.”69 Although addressing 
grievances is a vital part of a peace process and formation of a negotiated settlement, placing 
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certain guarantees/provisions can help compensate for the lack of trust that has naturally resulted 
from years of violent conflict. Therefore, guarantees/ provisions can, “help create an 
environment in which conflict parties are willing to give agreements a real chance… parties can 
develop greater confidence in each other’s commitment to abide by an agreement.”70    
A signal can be considered credible only when it is costly. That is, the higher and more 
significant the costly signal is the more likely it is to decrease the recurrence of violence since it 
also helps ameliorate commitment issues. Hence, Fortna explains that a ceasefire is a costly 
signal since a state is willing to limit its ability to wage war71, and the same can be said about the 
inclusion of a provision of a referendum in which the state is allowing the questioning of its 
sovereignty over a certain territory within its own borders. Implementing political provisions do 
not have high costs since it is easier to walk away from.  There is a small cost to loose in political 
provisions which is possibly the loss of popularity and support from the rebel’s side in which 
they are seen to be making too many concessions to the government, while on the government’s 
side they can be seen as dealing with terrorists and rebels therefore giving them some kind of 
legitimacy. However, if this happens, they can simply pull out and stop cooperating. Another 
reason why Jarstad and Nilson see that political provisions do not have a great impact is because 
they can be used as a mechanism by the governments as just a façade in front of the international 
community that they are committed to the peace process as to not be labeled spoilers.72 
Therefore, territorial agreements have a much more significant effect on the likelihood of the 
durability of peace, since it has a higher costly signal and therefore it is harder to pull out of or 
be retracted without risking the recurrence of violence once again; “…the referendum has 
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become almost an automatic step in the move towards statehood for any people, and as such, 
even when the circumstances are extremely challenging for an exercise in direct democracy, the 
referendum may well be unavoidable.”73 Other than the weight of a costly signal that the 
referendum holds, the legitimacy that it creates to the claims of secession is also important to 
consider.  
3.3 Legitimacy 
In the conflict resolution literature, referendums were historically held to acquire support 
from their subjects and gain legitimacy. The book by Matt Qvortrup called Referendums and 
Ethnic Conflict has a theory which states that referendums are the most appropriate, efficient and 
legitimate mechanisms since it is the “pure” acclamation of the people and do not include the 
political parties’ elites. 74 Therefore, elites and heads of states often utilize the use of a 
referendum in order to gain legitimacy for their own power and decision.75  
 Although there are arguments that claim that plebiscites and referendums are no less 
controversial than other mechanisms, we cannot deny that the advantage is significant since it 
will allow the people of concern and not the elites or any form of arbitrary decision to be made 
on an important issue such as ethnicity and boundaries.76 The establishment of a provision to 
hold a referendum has become an informal norm that secession movements should require their 
people to vote since this will establish their legitimacy.77 There are some arguments that say that 
with this guarantee of a referendum the legitimacy behind this tool can also help decrease the 
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commitment problem; “[t]he referendum’s perceived legitimacy may even help to ensure against 
subsequent breach, once a settlement is reached.”78  
 There is also certain literature on the legitimacy and significance of the presence of a 
negotiated settlement itself that could lead to a durable post-conflict peace. The agreement that 
results from a negotiation might be binding depending on the situation. Because peace 
negotiations are not binding, it is important that it culminates into a negotiated settlement since 
this gives the peace negotiation the effect of legalization.79 Although this might not be true for all 
cases, and it does not always guarantee commitment, “…it raises the cost of violating the peace 
agreement. Legalization also strengthens the credibility of commitments, improves the 
enforceability of the settlement…”80 There is also statistical evidence on the likelihood of peace 
failure after the formation of peace agreement and it was only 24.6% of the risk of failure after 
an indecisive outcome.81 Therefore, a combination of a negotiated settlement with the provision 
of the holding of a referendum increases the likelihood of a successful and durable peace 
settlement. There is a legitimate power that a referendum has on a negotiated settlement. Hence, 
a referendum is a form of deliberative democracy which increases its legitimacy since it is the 
people of concern who are the ones voting for their own futures which makes it a larger and less 
retractable cost. However, the weight of the referendum’s legitimacy, as well as its value as a 
costly signal, can be rendered useless unless the referendum is implemented in the right time. 
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There has been literature on the importance of timing of implementation of provisions. 
The design and timing of a referendum can lead to success even in cases where success is least 
likely to occur. Premature referendums especially ones that are poorly designed and not 
thoroughly thought-out have a higher likelihood of escalating conflict or lead to a continuous 
stalemate.82 Preferably in contexts of post-conflict environment the postponement of issues and 
provisions can lead to peace.  
There are two types of implementation of a postponed referendum on secession. One 
establishes an interim period where secession is neither agreed upon or denied however each side 
has a different expectation on the outcome. The entity has the choice later after assessing during 
the interim period if they would like to continue with unity or vote for independence. The second 
type has already an established agreement and inevitability of secession therefore the interim 
period can be seen as a time devoted for the preparation of the post-referendum period.83 These 
types of provisions are noteworthy since it does imply that there is an implicit agreement by the 
state to the idea of the possibility of self-determination, but there is also a chance for the state to 
test the possibility of a union in the interim period. Bougainville and Sudan, which are two out of 
the three cases that will be examined, implemented the first type of a provision for a postponed 
referendum referendum while East Timor lies in the second type of since the inevitability of 
secession was obvious from the outset.84 There are arguments that suggest that the postponement 
of an issue or in this case a referendum can be seen as a formalized way to ignore it. However, 
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the counter-argument to that is, “…in agreeing to address the issue in the future lies a recognition 
that there is an issue to be addressed – this may include an acknowledgement that the case, at 
least potentially, may indeed be one of self-determination.”85  
Other literature in time concerning conflict resolution focuses on the idea of deadlines 
and time pressure. This is mostly applied to the analyses of the time leading to the start of a 
negotiation, the negotiation process itself, and how it ends. While this thesis seeks to examine 
what happens after the ending of the negotiation process some of its arguments can be applied to 
the timings of the holding of sovereignty referendums. The main argument of deadlines and time 
pressure on negotiations is that the higher the time pressure and closer the deadline is that is set 
can lead to quicker concessions which can lead to some sort of agreement in a deadlock 
situation. However, one of the issues that arise with time pressure is that it could go the opposite 
way and encourage brinkmanship, in which each party will stand their grounds awaiting the 
other to give in due to this deadline. Hence, this could lead to ending the negotiation altogether 
with no results whatsoever.86   
There are three main conditions where time pressure has a negative impact on 
negotiations: (1) complex issues, when information is ambiguous or plainly lack of, when group 
dynamics come into play.87 This argument here can be applied to the timing of the 
implementation of sovereignty referendums. A shortage of time does not give enough depth and 
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analysis of issues especially when many complex issues are at hand. In this situation, a territorial 
dispute especially on eventual secession is a very complex matter that cannot be decided on in a 
rushed or premature manner.  Moreover, it is not enough time to process information, and 
negotiators tend to focus on the negative information or interpret it as negative. 
A provision for a postponed sovereignty referendum can provide some time for both 
sides of the party especially the central state to process information and the future implication of 
this partition. An interim period is perfect to allow for the state to try to right their wrongs and 
convince the adversaries to vote for unity while the adversaries at the same time can take the 
time to prepare themselves economically, politically, and socially for their eventual 
independence. Finally, when there is a group or individual negotiating on behalf of people, the 
time pressure makes them more competitive which could lead to a sub-optimal outcome or no 
outcome at all. However, what can make up for this stalemate is the inclusion of a provision such 
as a referendum which increases the likelihood of peace and can be considered a great costly 























In this chapter, we will see the struggle of Bougainville for independence that has begun 
ever since PNG gained its independence from Australia. Other than the grievances of being 
denied their independence, there were issues regarding the Panguna Mine which not only took 
advantage of the Bougainvilleans and their own natural resources but also caused so many 
cultural grievances as well as environmental issues. This caused the eruption of a 10-year long 
civil war which was starting to see its end in 1997 with the effort of New Zealand and Australia 
in mediating between Bougainville and the PNG in order to come to a negotiated settlement. 
There were three main phases of a peace process starting from 1997 -2001, all under a regional 
effort. The BPA was eventually signed in 2001 guaranteeing a provision for a postponed 
referendum which would be held after 10-15 years. The referendum provision has conditions 
attached to it (good governance, disarming) provided that these conditions are implemented and 
achieved then the referendum will be allowed to be held. Ever since 1997 until 20 years after the 
signing of the BPA, Bougainville did not witness a recurrence in violence and was working hard 
on developing itself to be ready for independence. The referendum was eventually held on 
November 23, 2019 with an overwhelming vote for independence.    
1. Background 
Bougainville is the most remote PNG province which is made of a group of islands 
located around 1,000 kilometers from mainland PNG sitting within the Solomon Islands 
archipelago.89 Bougainville was considered to be the richest Island in the Solomon Islands chain. 
In 1889 Bougainville has been under Germany’s colonial power however, after the defeat of 
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Germany in World War I, Bougainville was annexed by Australia.90 Although Bougainville was 
seeking independence it eventually failed and became part of PNG under Australian rule. Papua 
New Guinea eventually gained its independence in 1975. Bougainville has a population of 
around 300,000 which accounts for less than 4 % of PNG’s population and includes up to 
twenty-five language groups spread across ten clans that culturally identify with Melanesia.91 
The Panguna mine, which is considered to be the trigger of the ten-year civil war in 
Bougainville, was run by a British- Australian company called the Bougainville Copper Limited 
(BCL) which was one of the largest open-pit mines in the world in the 1970s and 1980s.92 
Initially, the conflict was about challenging the mining company and the PNG government over 
issues on the distribution of mine revenues as well as the negative impacts socially and 
environmentally it had on Bougainville. However, at some point issues of autonomy, secession, 
and independence were the main agenda of Bougainville.  
1.1 Panguna Mine 
  The Panguna mine was considered to be the backbone of PNG’s economy and the single 
source of income for the government. The BCL has generated a revenue of around $1.9 billion in 
the seventeen years of its operation from 1972-1989 which amounts to around 17 percent of 
PNG’s internal revenue.93  With this large profit, only 5.63 percent of it went to Bougainville 
divided into subcategories of 4.27 percent that went to the provincial government and only 1.63 
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percent was given to the local landowners where the mine is located.94 Other than the economic 
grievances surrounding the mine, there were social and environmental costs as well that were 
affecting Bougainville negatively. Land was taken away from the local communities which not 
only holds economic significance to them but more importantly it affected them socially and 
culturally; “The social and cultural significance of land was widely ignored by the management 
of the mining company and state authorities.”95 The locals were angered by the company and the 
government for not respecting the indigenous culture and their special status as the original 
owners of the land.96 Furthermore, there was resentment that only those who own land used for 
mining were compensated, while there is no compensation for the negative impact that the 
mining company has on the rest of the whole community.97 The benefits of modernization and 
mine revenue were mainly for the outsiders, while the local communities were just receiving the 
negative consequences of urbanization. There was a great influx of workers from outside of 
Bougainville who were squatting on their ancestral land. This influx of outsiders has brought 
with it an increase in crimes, alcoholism and prostitution which the locals were subject to. Due to 
all of these frustrations, the local community demanded reparations for the environmental 
degradation and negative effect that the mine had on their society and culture, as well as to form 
meaningful environmental protection measures. They have also demanded that large shares of 
the revenues that are generated by the mine to be given to the Bougainvilleans. However, these 
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demands were ignored by both PNG and the mining company, which resulted in one of the 
bloodiest conflicts in the South Pacific after WWII.  
2. Civil War  
Violence was triggered when a group of young locals brought the mining activities to a 
standstill by acts of sabotage by the end of 1988. The police could not control them; therefore, 
Papua New Guinea sent its military the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) to the 
island in 1989. This move resulted in the formation of a guerilla force in Bougainville called the 
Bougainville Revolution Army (BRA) lead by Francis Ona. The BRA was able to control and 
shut down the Panguna mine in the early stages of fighting in 1989 with some of their factions to 
this day still controlling it and keeping it shut. Furthermore, the BRA started taking a 
secessionist stance from early on in the conflict when Ona made a unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI) after the PNGDF withdrew from Bougainville in 1999. This was the not the 
first UDI Bougainville has declared. Another UDI was issued in 1975 just days before PNG 
became independent from their colonial authority Australia.98 However, this declaration was 
dismissed by PNG’s capital Port Moresby and, instead, a system of provincial governments with 
limited autonomous powers was constitutionalized in 1976. After this arrangement, discussions 
on secession have died down however, they have resurfaced by the 1980s since they have seen 
how limiting the autonomy arrangements were on their powers especially with those concerning 
the mine. 
This conflict was not only a war between the locals and the central government but also a 
conflict amongst the locals themselves. The PNG was unable to control or restore order in 
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Bougainville with the growing power of the BRA, hence they decided to withdraw in May 1990 
and imposed a blockade on the island. The embargo caused a deficiency in essential goods and 
shortages of medicine which only worsened the living conditions in the island. This only caused 
more frustration and increased the hostilities amongst the Bougainvilleans and has reignited 
conflicts amongst already traditionally enemy groups.99 The Bougainvilleans have been able to 
unite when they had a common enemy i.e. the national government and the mining company. 
However, “[i]n the absence of both of them, localised identities took precedence and were often 
a factor in conflict on the island.”100  This also lead to the creation of an opposing faction to the 
BRA, in which former BRA elements who were loyal to the PNG formed the Bougainville 
Resistance Forces (BRF).  Often the locals would join either the BRA or the resistance unit and it 
was not unusual that individuals would change sides. There were many ‘private wars’ that were 
fought amongst the BRA and the resistance on local issues, the more prevalent one being land 
disputes. 
Another idiosyncratic character of this conflict was that the parties were made up of 
many independent units that were based on kinship. Therefore, there was no main leader or 
hierarchal system of command and this was also the case with the PNGDF. The results of the 
conflict were from 3,000 to 20,000 deaths which was considered devastating at the time since 
Bougainville’s population before the conflict was about 150,000.101 There were many more 
extra-judicial killings by all groups involved in the conflict; by the end of 1997 around 10,000 
deaths have been reported.102 There was unknown large numbers of deaths as well caused by the 
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PNG blockade which was imposed after Ona’s UDI in 1999.103 There were several attempts 
made since 1988 to try and stop the violence and achieve peace but to no avail. However, it was 
not considered to be a waste of time since there were lessons learnt through these attempts. 
Finally, in 1995 a trajectory to peace was emerging with the revival of Bougainville’s provincial 
government called the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) and the willingness of 
several Bougainville factions to reconcile.   
3. Peace Process 
3.1 Ripeness 
With the revival of the BTG, there were efforts to facilitate negotiations between the 
Bougainville factions in Cairns Australia in 1995 between the BTG and BRF on one side and the 
Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) and BRA on the other side. This was the first time that 
moderate leaders representing the Bougainvillean factions came together in order to discuss 
strategies to end the violence. Although there were voices to end the violence early on in the 
conflict, it was only when the losses were more evident that there were efforts made to establish 
communication between opposing leaders in order to lead the way to localized peacemaking. 
They were also concerned that their chances to independence are not possible with a deeply 
divided Bougainville. Hence, in 1994 the opposing leaders in Bougainville were meeting 
informally which lead to more formal meetings held in Australia in 1995 however, due to the 
escalation of the conflict between the PNG and BRA in 1996 talks have halted however they did 
return again in mid-1997. Another event that lead to ripeness in the conflict was the Sandline 
affair.    
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The PNGDF was growing weaker and was losing drastically which led to Julius Chan the 
then PM of PNG to be entangled in the Sandline affair in which he had hired mercenaries whom 
he claimed were only hired for training the PNGDF but in reality, were there to attack the 
BRA.104 Julius Chan saw that if he was to find a solution to the Bougainville crisis it would 
guarantee his re-election. This affair has not only angered Bougainville but even the PNGDF, 
where they arrested and disarmed the Sandline mercenaries themselves. This move made the 
BRA and BIG leaders see the PNGDF in a newer more sympathetic light. The Sandline affair 
also could have resulted in a possible military coup in the PNG.105  This affair was also an eye 
opener for the BRA and the BIG that there is always a great risk in the greater escalation of 
conflict.  The PNGDF soldiers were also becoming war-weary since they were lesser in number 
and weaker than the Bougainville factions106; “Port Moresby, in its best condition, was unable to 
deploy more than 500 soldiers in Bougainville, which was completely inadequate for countering 
the BRA rebels.”107  Finally, this affair added more international pressure on the PNG to follow 
through in a peace process and there were also threats from Australia that it would withdraw its 
aid to the PNG.108  By mid-1997 real progress towards peace was happening when New Zealand 
hosted some mediation meetings at first between the Bougainville factions in order to build trust 
again between them which had allowed them to eventually have a united agenda and set of 
demands in the peace process with the PNG. 
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3.2 End of Conflict and first phase of peace process (June 1997- June 1999)  
New Zealand has made a lot of effort to broker meetings at first between the Bougainville 
factions and later including the PNG in the peace process around mid-1999. The New Zealand 
initiatives for reconciliation amongst the Bougainvilleans was encouraged by New Zealand’s 
Foreign Minister Don McKinnon.109 Due to the pre-negotiations that New Zealand hosted 
amongst the Bougainville factions in Burnham I, Bougainville was able to have a united front on 
what their agenda is and what their demands were for the PNG when they negotiated with them 
in Burnham II. In this phase, the end goal was not to achieve a peace agreement but instead to 
build a pathway and build an environment in order for a peace process to be able to take place. 
The most important part in this phase was the reconciliation between the Bougainville factions 
themselves. The successful pre-negotiations led to the Burnham Truce which secured the most 
durable ceasefire in Bougainville’s history which officially ended the conflict; “Parties agree 
interim measures to refrain from intimidation and armed confrontation, to allow freedom of 
movement, respect human rights, and enforcement mechanism.”110 One of the main reasons for 
the successful pre-negotiation of the first Burnham meetings between the Bougainville factions 
was due to the lack of deadline diplomacy in order to provide them with enough time to 
reconcile amongst each other.111 
3.2.1 Pre-negotiations 
Although this phase of the negotiations was focused on reconciling between Bougainville 
factions, one of the main issues that resulted in a deadlock amongst them is the question of a 
referendum and secession. This was a very important issue to discuss since they had to agree on 
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a united stance concerning this topic when it came the time to discuss it with the PNG. The intra-
Bougainville negotiations did not occur and result in a united front without great difficulty. The 
pro-secessionists believed that Bougainville was already independent ever since Ona’s UDI in 
1999 and therefore no referendum on the question of its independence is needed. The pro-
integrationists were calling for holding a referendum on independence so that it could be a 
democratic process in which the communities of Bougainville themselves can determine their 
own political future. Other smaller Bougainville factions that were also pro-integrationists feared 
that the armed BRA groups will rule them all if the referendum was to be held too early before 
the divisions amongst the Bougainvilleans were reconciled and normalcy returned. Hence, there 
were demands for the postponement of the referendum to a later period in order to allow some 
time for the weapons disposal process to be implemented as well as to work on reconciliation. 
Other minor groups were adamantly opposed on any idea of secession and proposed to be 
autonomous but still be part of the PNG. Eventually, in the Bougainville People’s Congress they 
reached compromises amongst each other where the pro-secessionists accepted that the issue of 
Bougainville’s political status would be dealt with through a referendum but only under the 
condition that it is binding. As for appeasing the integrationists especially those who proposed its 
postponement, it was agreed that there will be an autonomous arrangement however, a 
referendum on the future of Bougainville’s political status will be held within 6-8 years. Thus, 
the united position that Bougainville agreed on was that the referendum will be held after 6-8 
years and that it must be binding on both the PNG and all of Bougainville regardless of whether 
particular areas voted differently than the majority. 112  
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3.3 Second phase of peace process (June 1999- August 2001)   
This is the phase in the peace process in which each party in the conflict was working to draft 
a comprehensive peace agreement named the BPA. The Bougainvilleans had the upper hand and 
a stronger position throughout the two years of negotiations. The power parity level between 
Bougainville and the PNG was the rebel superiority level, where BRA had military dominance 
towards the end of the conflict. With this asymmetric power parity, the PNG realized that the 
BRA has the power for further disruption due to their control of most of the arms.113 
Furthermore, the Ona faction who believed that they have already gained independence early on 
in the conflict refused to join the negotiations hence limiting the range of compromises that the 
Bougainvilleans can make on the  secession issue for fear of losing popular support in 
Bougainville to Ona, which increased the pressure on PNG.114 Moreover, the PNG has suffered 
majorly from this conflict, “…in terms of impacts on the economy, damage to morale in the 
police and the army, and undermining the country’s international human rights reputation.”115  
3.3.1 Deadlock on Referendum issue  
The negotiations on the development of the BPA occurred in 23 sessions over the length 
of more than two years in sessions that lasted a day or even a whole month.116 In the early 
negotiation period, the PNG authorities always tried to avoid the discussion of the issue of the 
referendum; however, there was no progress happening on a peace settlement which led to a 
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stalemate on the referendum issue. When it came to the negotiations between Bougainville and 
PNG, Bougainville’s proposal of the referendum and autonomy arrangement that they have 
formed in New Zealand was refused by the PNG since they believe that this could rile up other 
provinces in the PNG to seek secession and therefore threaten their sovereignty. Bougainville did 
not have previous examples or lessons that they could have followed since the main examples of 
island autonomies were all arising from the colonial context. Hence, the relationship between an 
autonomous island and their former/ present occupier has had interests in helping build their 
capacities and providing resources to them.117 However, in the case of Bougainville, it is an 
island that is considered to be part of a ‘parent state’ (PNG), hence the relationship here is the 
feeling that Bougainville’s claim to self-determination is a major threat to its territorial integrity. 
Moreover, the PNG has had a history of micro-national movements with many of their provinces 
and they saw that allowing Bougainville a referendum on secession could entice them to seek 
autonomy or independence. The other issue the PNG had was the proposed idea that there might 
be more than one referendum held following the New Caledonia example where they held 
around three referendums for independence from France.118 Bougainville tried to compromise by 
dropping the idea of more than one referendum as well as the proposal on the special majorities 
that they have agreed upon amongst themselves in the intra-Bougainville pre-negotiations 
mentioned above. However, even after this concession the PNG was still hesitant since the 
referendum is seen as a threat to their sovereignty additionally, they could potentially loose 
Bougainville which was the backbone of their economy. The stalemate was finally broken in 
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2000 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia Alexander Downer who formed a 
compromise proposal on the issue of the referendum.119 
3.3.2 Deadlock Broken  
Downer’s proposal states that the PNG should constitutionally guarantee the holding of the 
referendum, however it would be held after a longer period than the one that the Bougainvilleans 
originally proposed (6-8 years) to 10-15 years after the establishment of an autonomous 
Bougainville government. Finally, the outcome will not be binding as previously proposed and 
the result of the referendum must be discussed first between Bougainville and the PNG with the 
PNG parliament having the final decision-making authority. The main point in this proposal is 
the long postponement period of the referendum, “… aimed to give the parties the opportunity to 
build trust and reach a better understanding through the operation of the autonomy 
arrangements…”120  
This proposal was able to save the negotiation process which has already made so much 
progress. The proposal was fair enough providing both parties what they had sought for. This 
would provide the PNG the opportunity to implement the autonomy arrangements so well in 
order to bridge differences between them and the Bouganivilleans and convince them to vote 
against independence; “The assumption was that PNG would grasp the opportunity to make the 
autonomy arrangements work so well (for example, through financial support, transfer of 
powers, capacity building) that even many pro-secessionists might be persuaded to vote against 
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secession.”121 Moreover, the PNG was appeased due to the non-binding element of the 
referendum.  
In this proposal, we can see a concession on behalf of Bougainville since the proposal is 
substituting the binding referendum into a non-binding one that is subject to the approval of the 
PNG parliament. However, Downer guarantees that the PNG will be constitutionally obligated to 
consult with Bougainville about the results. Moreover, the autonomous arrangement was 
advantageous to the Bougainvilleans since they have full authority to administer their own 
territory, from land to minerals and the environment.122 There are some exceptions to their power 
including foreign affairs, central banking, international trade etc. However, Bougainville will 
have its own police force and taxation power, as well as its own judicial system, and legislation. 
There has been talk amongst the Bougainville leaders on the East Timorese independence 
referendum in 1999. Joseph Kabui a former BRA leader and first president of the Autonomous 
Region of Bougainville as well as former president of Bougainville’s people congress has stated 
that, “East Timor is a welcome regional precedent, a welcome wind of change. And if we cannot 
have a vote about our future in the same way —well, that will be like having a lid on top of a 
simmering volcano.”123 Hence, Downer has used the backdrop of the East Timorese referendum, 
emphasizing that just like his proposal it was a non-binding provision, however with the pressure 
of the international community Indonesia was forced to honor the outcome of independence124; 
“He pointed to the precedent of East Timor, saying that although the outcome of its 1999 
referendum was not binding on Indonesia, once an overwhelming majority of East Timorese 
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voted in favour of independence the international community ensured that the vote was 
honoured.”125 Hence, Downer promised Bougainville that there will be the same pressure and 
interest of the international community on the issue of their referendum; “Backstage, Downer 
and the other influential international players persuaded them that the international community 
could and would pressure Papua New Guinea to honour a vote for independence at that time. 
Because so much of the PNG budget at that time was funded by Australia, it seemed plausible 
that this pressure would work.”126 The Bougainville leaders were convinced that they would have 
the same international support as East Timor and will result in a similar outcome.127  
4. BPA 
Finally, the BPA was signed in 2001 tackling three main elements: (1) formation of an 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), (2) disposal of weapons under UN supervision, 
(3) a provision for a postponed referendum within 10-15 years on the question of Bougainville’s 
future political status. The referendum will be held only after the establishment of autonomy of 
Bougainville which could only be established after the total disarmament of the Bougainville 
factions and disposal of arms. Furthermore, Bougainville must illustrate good governance 
according to international standards specified in section C number 313(a) in the BPA; “The 
benchmarks to be used in determining good governance will take account of internationally 
accepted standards of good governance as they are applicable and implemented in the 
circumstances of Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea.”128 The referendum was 
promised to be held within 10-15 years as stipulated in 312 (a) after the first ABG elections 
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which were held in May-June 2005 which schedules the referendum anywhere between mid-
2015 and mid-2020; “… no earlier than 10 years and, in any case, no later than 15 years after the 
election of the first autonomous Bougainville Government.”129  
Bougainville’s autonomy arrangement is both territorial and asymmetrical hence it is the 
most unique and different case compared to the rest of the provinces in the PNG especially with 
the promise of a postponed referendum. The BPA states that the provisions on the referendum 
must be constitutionally guaranteed as well as demands that this agreement should be 
incorporated in PNG’s constitution; “BPA (C)(15): 309. The National Government will move 
amendments to the National Constitution to guarantee a referendum on Bougainville’s future 
political status… 320. This agreement will be given effect through Constitutional Laws.”130 
Another important provision in the BPA is that the autonomy arrangement of Bougainville and 
the referendum cannot be revised or changed by the PNG parliament without consent by the 
Bougainville legislature stipulated in section D number 325 (a)(b).  
As stipulated in section B number 14, Bougainville will form their own constitution by a 
broadly representative body namely Bougainville Constitutional Commission (BCC) and a 
Bougainville Constituent Assembly both recognized by the PNG; “The Bougainville Interim 
Provincial Government in consultation with the Bougainville People’s Congress will establish a 
Constitutional Commission and a Constituent Assembly to make the Bougainville 
Constitution.”131 The agreement states that the constitution should include the Bougainvillean’s 
choice of names for both their government and Bougainville itself. The name that was decided 
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upon for their government is the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) and for 
Bougainville the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in which both names highlight 
Bougainville’s special status in the PNG compared to the other provinces. Compared to the 
previous system of devolution of 1976 where the provinces were always subordinate to the 
national government which had the power to suspend provincial government or to revoke their 
power, there is more intergovernmental relations on equal footing between the national 
government and Bougainville. The agreement started to be enacted in 2002.  
4.1 Incentives 
The BPA was fair enough to provide conditions and incentives for both parties in the conflict 
in order for the provisions to be enacted one by one. The main reason for Bougainville especially 
the pro-secessionists to accept autonomy and not immediate independence is because of the 
provision for a postponed referendum which keeps the subject matter of secession still relevant 
and significant even after 10- 15 years.132 It was surprising that Bougainville accepted the 
condition that the referendum would be non-binding especially since they could have held their 
grounds seeing that they had a stronger position on the negotiating table. However, what led to 
this compromise is due to the costly signal that the PNG has given first of all when they accepted 
the referendum provision as a whole. The other main costly signal is that it would be 
constitutionally guaranteed meaning that the holding of the referendum cannot be ignored even 
after so many years. Bougainville has also accepted demilitarization and disarming which can be 
considered as a great concession and costly signal since this put the rebels in a vulnerable 
position with no military or arm power. However, the main incentive for accepting this condition 
 
132 Ghai and Regan, “Unitary State, Devolution, Autonomy, Secession.” 
61 
 
was because the provision was linked to a series of other provisions that must be achieved before 
even having the countdown to the holding of the referendum. As mentioned above if 
disarmament is not achieved there will be no establishment of an autonomous Bougainville. 
Hence, with no autonomy established countdown to the holding of the referendum will not start. 
Another incentive for the concession on disarmament was that the PNG must withdraw its troops 
first before the process of demilitarization and weapons disposal.133  
Although the concept of deadline diplomacy is usually used when speaking of the negotiation 
process itself and not the implementation of a peace settlement it is possible to apply it in this 
context. Since the referendum will be held in10-15 years, this allows Bougainville to develop 
institutions and gain experience in governing their own territory, in order to be ready for their 
possible independence in the future. This long period of time will also give them more time to 
reconcile amongst each other and build a unified Bougainville which will surely have a high rate 
in independence vote when the time comes; as noted by Wallis, it was hoped that "the deferred 
referendum would play a nation-building role, as it would give Bougainvilleans time to continue 
reconciliation and to learn to work together."134 Finally, Bougainville saw that international 
pressure has aided them so far in influencing the national government to agree to a 
constitutionally guaranteed referendum; therefore, they would have the same support from the 
international community when the time of the referendum comes, in which, “the PNG 
government would find it difficult to ignore the result.”135 
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As for the main reasons and incentives behind PNG’s concessions to the provision of the 
referendum is due to the conditions attached to the referendum. The PNG since agreed to the a 
provision for a postponed referendum only if Bougainville would agree to have an autonomous 
government as an interim period in order to give the chance to promote for integration. The 
countdown to the referendum will start only after the establishment of autonomy of Bougainville 
which according to the BPA will occur after the total disarmament of Bougainville. Therefore, 
the PNG would have an additional few more years before the establishment of the ABG to push 
the issue of secession further longer.  
Once again, the concept of deadline diplomacy can be applied here since postponing the 
referendum does not put pressure on PNG about the possibility of losing territory so soon after 
the war. It is because there is no near deadline, the PNG are allowed to try and change the minds 
of Bougainvelleans to integration. Another more important specification in the referendum is that 
it is advisory where if the result is desiring secession it will have to be ratified by the national 
parliament. One would believe that this could have be an issue of contention that could have 
resulted in the recurrence of violence; however, this was not the case. Although the provision of 
the referendum was one of the main reasons for the appeasement of the Bougainvilleans which 
brought an end to the conflict there were other factors special to the Bougainville case that have 
also increased the likelihood of a successful peace process and a durable peace agreement. 
5. The ‘Pacific Way’ and Regional intervention    
Peacekeeping is a vital component in the peace process which also affects how the 
negotiations are set out and also affects their result; “…peacekeeping is a 'type of conflict 
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resolution' and the process and the outcome are probably not separable.”136 The three main peace 
keeping monitoring groups in Bougainville were the: (1) New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring 
Group (November 1997-March 1998), (2) Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (April 1998-
June 2003), (3) United Nations (UN) observer mission (1998- June 2005). The regional 
monitoring groups were the most important and biggest in size compared to the UN observer 
mission which consisted of no more than six personnel that monitored the ceasefire and offered 
mediation support as well as organized the demilitarization process.137 Mediation and 
negotiations were mostly taken upon by the regional peace keepers as well as the elders and 
chiefs in the Bougainville community which resulted in executing the peace process the ‘Pacific 
way’.  
The ‘Pacific way’ was a very unique characteristic of the Bougainville case which was 
one of the main factors that have contributed in the durability of the agreements and the 
successful peace process that has resulted because of it.138 Before the intra-Bougainville pre-
negotiations there were countless of lose agreements between Bougainvilleans themselves and 
between Bougainville and PNG until the Burnham Truce (I and II) and the Lincoln agreement 
that have resulted due to the  ‘Pacific way’ of meetings and reconciliation which led to an in-
revocable ceasefire and encouraged further negotiations resulting in the BPA. 
At both meetings in Burnham hosted by New Zealand, the process started with the Maori 
cultural greeting which have brought not only the Bougainvilleans together but also the 
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Bougainvilleans and the PNG in the second Burnham meeting.139 The ‘Pacific way’ is a highly 
inclusive process and, where each side must be willing and happy in order to proceed. 
Furthermore, there is patience, considerations of each other and flexibility which fostered trust 
and a successful peace process. Finally, reconciliation ceremonies are entrenched in 
Bougainvillean and PNG culture, therefore it was very important for them to achieve it and once 
a reconciliation is made and an apology is accepted there is no going back.140 Hence, due to the 
‘Pacific Way’ the talks were conducted in New Zealand, they have paved the way for the second 
phase of the peace process to discuss the drafting of the BPA. Australia was more active in the 
second phase of the peace process.  
As mentioned above it was the Australian minister of foreign affairs that helped resolve the 
deadlock that the parties in the conflict faced in their negotiations on the issue of the referendum. 
This was seen as something surprising since Australia ever since the beginning of the conflict 
has always been on PNG’s side stating that its sovereignty is important. Australia has also given 
military aid and personnel to help the PNGDF and finally was the colonial authority that ordered 
the establishment of the Panguna mine which was the trigger of the conflict. This major policy 
change was a result of the close engagement of Australia in the peace process through the 
regional Peace Monitoring Group it has been leading since 1998. Through their monitoring they 
got to see how deep the issues really are and understand the demands of Bougainville more and 
understand the large gap between the PNG and Bougainville positions. Had non-regional parties 
intervened in the peace process, the conflict could would have been continuing and not have 
achieved more than 20 years of peace as it did now. It is because of the regional multinational 
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peacekeepers that are familiar with the ‘Pacific way’ of negotiations and meetings that 
Bougainville is one of the most successful cases of a peace process.141  
6. Implementation History: 5 years    
 After the signing of the BPA, a few skirmishes have occurred between the PNGDF and 
some youth from the leta village in December 19 2001.142 However, the confrontation was not 
too serious for it to be considered a violation of the ceasefire agreement. The Minister For 
Bougainville Affairs in the national government Sir Moi Avei has even commended the 
combatants for their commitment to peace which further assured the national government before 
committing to the inclusion of the provisions of the BPA in their constitution; “The commitment 
to the goal of peace by peaceful means displayed by ex-combatants meant that they put away 
many guns and helped to convince the National Parliament to give their support before the bills 
to give legal effect to the Bougainville Peace Agreement were put to vote.”143  
On January 23, 2002 the PNG parliament has officially passed the constitutional 
amendments related to Bougainville. On September 3, 2002 Bougainville’s governor John 
Momis announced the formation of the BCC that will help draft the new Bougainville 
constitution which establishes the autonomous arrangements for Bougainville and includes a 
provision for a postponed referendum. The constitution making process in Bougainvillea made 
sure to elect representatives from different social economic and political groups especially 
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traditional chiefs and leaders to ensure that there is a broad representation of the people of the 
Bougainville. The constitution made sure to set out principles of national goals as well as 
illustrate their history and how the people of Bougainville have shared symbols and culture and 
attempts to define future Bougainvillean identity. By including the provision for a postponed 
referendum, the constitution satisfies both the integration and independence supporters, since it 
does recognize that the people of Bougainville should have the opportunity to see for themselves 
through the referendum if after a process of trying to reconcile they want to seek their own 
sovereign state or remain with the status quo of being autonomous within PNG. This plays into 
the deliberative democratic theory concept since the referendum assures the political inclusion of 
all factions of Bougainville in which the future of their territory is in their hands. This appeases 
the pro-integrationists since no matter what the result is, they would have to accept it due to its 
legitimacy since it is the result of the Bougainvilleans’ voices and opinions. The legitimacy of 
the referendum and its outcome also plays a role in gaining international support when the time 
comes to convince the PNG to accept the results.    
After the constitution was made it was handed over to the ABG on January 2004.144 
While the constitution was being formed the weapons disposal process was in progress under the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) and Peace Monitoring Group. 
Stages I and II of disarmament have commenced in 2001, in which stage I was collecting and 
placing the weapons in small containers and stage II was to take these containers away in to large 
shipping containers. The PMG sometimes would transport ex-combatants around the island to 
 




help encourage disarmament and participate in disposal ritualistic ceremonies.145 According to a 
report by the Secretary general on the UN office in Bougainville, by February 2003, 80.2 percent 
of Bougainville has already reached stage II. The main obstacle to the process is the refusal of 
the Ona faction to participate, however despite that they have managed to move more than half 
of the weapons out of villages to centralized steel containers under UNOMB observation. By 
mid- 2005 the disarmament process was successful and was given the verification it needed by 
the UNOMB to allow for the start of the first elections even to be held by the ABG which were 
held from May 20-June 2 2005.   
Despite the holding of the elections, Bougainville did not have enough administrative 
power or capacity to hold the elections, which was making the transfer of power from PNG to 
Bougainville harder and longer.146 Financially one would expect PNG to push significant amount 
of funding to Bougainville in order to persuade them against independence however, funding in 
the first full year of ABG’s autonomy was at a minimum. Some national government elements, 
believed that since a high rate of independence vote was bound to happen in the future, the PNG 
should not invest too much into Bougainville due to the fiscal crisis they were going through. On 
the other hand, if Bougainville does not receive that funding, aid and autonomy measures that 
they highly expect, it can cause frustrations and potential recurrence of violence. The ABG was 
getting frustrated and even thought of opening the mine once again in order to generate their own 
revenue and build up Bougainville in order to have enough capacity to be independent. As for 
PNG’s side, they believed that ABG is pushing the limit on the power that is allowed to be 
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autonomous (ex. participating in international meeting in the region) and that the ABG is too 
confrontational when dealing on certain issues with the national government.147   
Despite these bumps during the infancy stage of the autonomy arrangements, 
Bougainville has been able to develop its governance institutions, a constitution, parliament etc.; 
“the ABG has successfully conducted three general elections, passed 50-plus pieces of 
legislation and established its own public service structures and financial management system 
separate from those of Papua New Guinea.”148 Bougainville has also managed to draw in foreign 
investors in order to aid them in their economic development. The economic development of 
Bougainville is the most lacking due to the shutdown of the Panguna mine until this day. 
Although there have been talks throughout the years of re-opening it, Bougainville leaders do not 
want the risk of recurrence of violence therefore they believe that its best left closed until 
Bougainville is more stable.  
The referendum was eventually held on November 23 2019, after it has been postponed 
over the years starting from 2016, however due to the deadline of 15 years it had to be held on 
2019. The voting polls were open for 14 days, asking the people to choose between greater 
autonomy or independence. The turn-out was overwhelming of around 180,000 Bougainvilleans 
ready to vote. The result was a landslide win for independence in which almost, “98% of people 
(176,928 people) voted for independence and less than 2% (3,043 people) voted to remain as part 
of Papua New Guinea but with “greater autonomy.””149 Now, the next step for Bougainville to 
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gain its official independence is the ratification of the result by the PNG parliament, along with 
discussing the results with Bougainville to set out a plan for its future. James Marape the Prime 
Minister of the PNG has indicated that he still wants Bougainville to work hard for their 
economic autonomy, however Momis was reassuring that discussions with the PNG would be 
over independence and nothing else.150   
7. Conclusion   
The two main phases of the peace process were very important to retrace and analyze in 
order to understand the reasons behind the successful post-conflict environment of Bougainville. 
What was illustrated from retracing the peace process was that a comprehensive agreement 
would not have existed had it not first of all included a promised referendum and second of all, 
had it not been postponed. Despite, the long reconciliation process that occurred in the pre-
negotiation stages headed by New Zealand, a deadlock in the peace process occurred due to the 
issue of the referendum. Eventually, the PNG has shown a great costly signal by accepting a 
promised referendum that put in question whether it will be losing a territory or not in the future. 
However, Bougainville has also shown a costly signal by accepting its non-binding characteristic 
and its postponement to a much longer period than what they expected. In order to appease the 
Bougainville party, the BPA stipulated that the agreement along with its provisions must be 
legalized by adopting it into PNG’s constitution. This gives assurance to Bougainville that even 
if the issue of their political status is not dealt with at the moment, it will still be a pertinent issue 
to be dealt with even if it is long years after the conflict.  
 




Since the provision of the provision for a postponed referendum in the BPA had a 
‘double entrenchment arrangement’151 in which there were conditions and incentives for each 
side to follow, this increased the likelihood of a successful peace process and a peaceful post-
conflict environment for over twenty years; “The architecture of sequenced, linked commitments 
described above deserves some of the credit for it holding so far.”152 It is this double 
entrenchment and ‘linked commitments’ that makes the BPA a ‘well-designed’ agreement. 
Because of its effective drafting it helped ameliorate the commitment and mistrust issues since 
there were concessions on both sides which formed a durable peace agreement. The autonomy 
arrangements and postponement of the referendum were other elements that helped enhance the 
‘well-designed’ agreement.  
The postponed referendum allowed both Bougainville and PNG not to make rash 
decisions. It allowed a breathing space for the Bougainville to continue its reconciliation 
processes in order to strengthen the unity and identity of the Bougainvilleans as well as allowed 
them some time to develop and enhance their governance institutions in order to prepare for their 
independence; “The Bougainville case suggests that autonomy arrangements and deferred 
referendums can help to achieve peace in the aftermath of violent self-determination disputes, if 
they are accompanied by efforts to reconcile differences and to create a common identity.”153 As 
for the PNG it allowed them to recuperate from the long years of war and from their fiscal crisis. 
Moreover, it provided an opportunity for the PNG to encourage the pro-secessionists to remain 
autonomous under the PNG. The result was that there was no recurrence of violence even five 
years after the conflict which is the main time frame that this thesis is concerned about.  
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 The context and windows of opportunity also played a role in how the peace process and 
how it resulted in the BPA including  a provision for a postponed independence referendum . 
One important ripe moment was the asymmetry in the power parity between the PNG the BRA. 
The BRA had more power and control, and had the upper-hand by the end of the conflict. The 
PNGDF finally realized that the rebels are an imminent power that can continue with destruction 
since they have the power to do so. Moreover, the PNGDF was war weary and what finally 
pushed them to opt for a peaceful manner of settlement was the Sandline affair discussed above. 
Another important context which allowed for the stipulation of the provision of the referendum 
in the BPA, is the changed foreign policy of Australia towards the PNG. Australia at the start has 
always supported the PNG and its territorial integrity. However, after Australia heading a 
monitoring group for several years in Bougainville, they realized the reality of the situation on 
the ground. The Australian Prime Minister Alexander Downer was the reason for breaking the 
deadlock that the peace process faced over the referendum issue. His double entrenchment 
proposal on the referendum issue was accepted by both parties and was fully adopted in the 
BPA. 
Finally, what makes Bougainville a very unique successful case was that the third-party 
intervention was mostly regional with the UN having a very light presence in the peace process. 
However, the UN did have an important role in monitoring the disarmament process which 
without its approval of its success an autonomous Bougainville could not have been established. 
Nonetheless, it was the mediating intervention of New Zealand and Australia that played a great 
role in the formation of the BPA. It was the familiarity and knowledge of the regional 
multinational peacekeepers with the ‘pacific way’ of negotiations and meetings that contributed 
to Bougainville being one of the most successful cases of a peace process and a durable peace 
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settlement that has maintained peace for over twenty years. It will be interesting see in future 
studies whether the weight of the referendum and its legitimate result still carry the same power 
and importance now that the referendum was held after 15 years of the signing of the agreement 
since the PNG still must make the decision whether they will accept the overwhelming result of 
independence and whether there will be a new country in the international community.  








 The South Sudanese struggle for independence dates back to the 1950s right after the 
independence of Sudan from England and Egypt. It started with the agenda of being an 
autonomous region under the North after Sudan gained its independence however, this was 
refused by the national parliament immediately. Moreover, the Southerners were seen as second-
class citizens being subject to slavery by the North. There was also the imposition of Islam and 
Arabic on the South which was majority Christian and its main language was English. This 
resulted in the country falling into a civil war that lasted around 50 years, which not only 
affected them but also destabilized the region. In the 1970s the civil war stopped for around 11 
years after the signing of the Addis Ababa agreements which provided the South with certain 
controlled self-governing powers however, the agreement was nullified by the Sudanese 
president which reignited the war once again in the 1980s. Later on, an important agreement was 
formed known as the DoP by the IGAD in 1994, which advocated for the right of the 
Southerners to self-determination; however, this was refused by the North and the war continued 
until the early 2000s. Due to a series of internal and external factors as well as moments of 
ripeness a peace process was reinitiated in 2002 which led to the formation of the Machakos 
protocol which was the blueprint of the CPA. The CPA granted the South high autonomy 
arrangements for six years however with a major condition of cooperating with the North on the 
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unity of the country. During the interim period, although there were certain acts of violence, 
there was no recurrence of violence to the intensity and scale of the civil war. The independence 
referendum was eventually held in 2011 which resulted in 98.8 percent of Southerners voting for 
independence which led to their secession and was the 193rd state member of the UN.   
 
1. Background   
 The struggle of South Sudan for self-determination originates to around fifty years prior 
to its independence in 2011.  The southerners have sought independence ever since Sudan gained 
its independence from Egypt and the British.155 The colonial legacy that the British have left 
Sudan with was the empowerment of the Sudanese Arab which enlarged the division between the 
North and the South. This empowerment of the North subjected the South to racism and slavery 
since the North saw them as inferior to them, hence there was resentment from the South towards 
the North ever since the colonial period. Another outcome of the colonial legacy was the great 
difference in identity and culture between the North and the South. English and Christianity were 
encouraged and concentrated in the South while the Arabic speakers and Muslims remained in 
the North.156 There was even a demarcated line drawn by the British to separate the two 
administered regions, which gave an even stronger ground for the South to claim its own 
independence.   
 Even during the post-independence period, the South was subjected to exploitation and 
domination by the North. Right after independence, the South demanded that the new Sudan 
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Solutions,” Journal of African Elections 10, no. 1 (January 2011): 1–32, https://doi.org/10.20940/jae/2011/v10i1a1.  
156 Edmund Arthur Brown, “Secession from Failed States: Ethical and Practical Issues with Current Approaches,” 
PhD diss., (University of Leicester, 2018), https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/41076/1/2018BrownEAPhD.pdf.  
75 
 
should adopt a federal system in which the South would be autonomous. The National Unionist 
Party (NUP) held the majority of seats in parliament at that time and refused to adopt the federal 
system157 since they, “equated federation with secession, rather than as a way to maintain 
national unity. Advocacy of even moderate federal demands by southerners was considered 
tantamount to subversion and was treated as such.”158 This was not a surprising result from the 
NUP since their agenda before the independence of Sudan was to have one united sovereign 
nation with Egypt under the umbrella of the Nile Valley. Hence, their agenda is towards union 
always in whatever situation they are in, and in this situation with the independence of Sudan, it 
would go against their agenda if they would have accepted the federation system that the South 
has suggested. The North forcefully subjected on the South the policy of Arabization and 
Islamicisation.159 The Southerners felt that they were being deprived of their own identity which 
festered their hatred towards the North even more. The North even implemented policies in 
which they divided Sudan according to ethnicities and religions in order to divide and control the 
periphery regions.160 There has also been unequal development and exploitation by the central 
the country to the peripheries. The concentration was on the Northern Nile Valley and neglected 
the rest of the peripheral regions especially the South.161 Hence, one of the other main reasons 
for the eruption of violence whether between the North and South or within the South is a fight 
for scarce resources as well as land. There was also the issue of the 1970 Unregistered Land Act 
that was imposed by the North which ultimately disregards any form of customary landowning in 
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the South.162 The North then would claim ownership of the lands and would lease them to large 
farms, or would use them as gift/rewards to their elite allies.   
1.1 Civil Wars    
1.1.1 First Civil War (1955-1972) 
The North and South fought two dreadful civil wars. The first civil war was between 
1955 and 1972, triggered by military mutiny in Torit (a city in South Sudan) after Khartoum 
refused the federal system that they have suggested. This insurgency later transformed into a 
movement known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and then into the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A). By 1972, the conflict ended with the Addis Ababa 
Agreement which granted the South self-governing powers. Some of the important provisions in 
the agreement was the unification of the provinces of Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal, and Upper Nile 
which will be known as the Southern Region. South Sudan is also allowed to use English as its 
principle language. The South would also have its own executive body known as the High 
Executive Council (HEC) where its president will be appointed by the President of Sudan with 
the recommendation of South Sudan’s legislative body known as the People’s Regional 
Assembly. The council is then formed and ministers will be appointed by the President of Sudan 
with the recommendation of candidates by the president of the HEC. The agreement clearly 
stipulates that the HEC and legislative body cannot exercise any powers on matters of ‘national 
nature’ with the agreement specifying some of these matters. Finally, there will be an attempt for 
the integration of southern soldiers to the national army of Sudan.  
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In a series of Lectures in Juba University in 2014 discussing the Addis Ababa agreement,  
Alfred Lokuji a professor in the university, as well as an undersecretary in the Ministry of 
Education in South Sudan, has stated that, “there was a high level of interference from Khartoum 
at that time, and having the … forces fully integrated in the national army left the South without 
any sort of military guarantee… when Nimeiri did not like the legislature, he dissolved it. Is that 
true autonomy?”163 Other than the interference of Khartoum that is not stipulated in the 
agreement but imposed on South Sudan, the agreement itself illustrates that the South Sudanese 
do not have a great role in the formation of their own legislative and executive bodies. 
Furthermore, as Lokuji has mentioned, the integration of soldiers left the South in a vulnerable 
position with no guarantees. All of these mistakes taught the South Sudanese lessons to take with 
them when negotiating in the future the provisions of the CPA, which will be discussed further 
below. Nevertheless, this arrangement was adopted in the national constitution in 1973 and has 
lasted for around eleven years until it was unilaterally removed by then president Jaafar Nimeiri 
in 1983. Although this agreement was not durable and failed, it still was a very important 
stepping stone in Sudanese history since it was the first time the South was given autonomy and 
acknowledged the non-Islamic culture of the South.164 
1.1.2 The Second Civil War (1983-2005) 
The annulment of the agreement by the North sparked another military mutiny and another 
civil war in 1983 which lasted all the way to 2005. By 1989 the year of the Sudanese coup d’état, 
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the casualties of the war along with the famine was estimated to be around 250,000.165 Any 
serious first attempt to end the violence and achieve a peace agreement was at the start of the 
second civil war. However, any effort or progress ended when a military coup occurred and 
established the National Islamic Front headed by then General now President Omar Al Bashir.  
This conflict was further escalated when divisions and conflicts were occurring amongst 
the Southerners themselves, other than their main issue against the Muslim-dominated North. 
The first conflict that broke out between the southerners was in 1991 between the SPLA and a 
breakaway faction. It was between longtime SPLM leader Dr. John Garang who was a Dinka and 
the breakaway group who were Nuer led by Riek Machar. The SPLM/A had a bad reputation 
amongst the Nuer due to the heavy taxation, human rights abuses, and forced conscriptions that 
they imposed. Furthermore, Garang’s goal in the Sudan war was for a secular but united Sudan 
which a lot of the Southerners believed was unrealistic especially after the coup in 1989 that has 
put Bashir a fundamentalist Islamist in power and therefore were calling for a complete 
secession.166 The conflict that erupted in 1991 amongst the Southerners was so devastating that 
the UN estimated that the population of South Sudan, “declined 1.9 percent in the year of 1993, 
and that the excess mortality in that year alone was 220,000.”167 The Government of Sudan 
(GoS) further exacerbated the situation in the South by funding and arming factions that were 
against the SPLM/A, and promised peace with those who broke out of the SPLM/A and went 
against Garang. The GoS even supported local leaders dividing the Nuer clans themselves 
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(Misseriya vs. Dinka) which was all part of the GoS’s policy at the time to weaken the southern 
resistance, as well as allow them to explore the oil fields located in the southern region and 
control them.168  
2. Peace Initiatives 1994-2005  
 The early 1990s saw the birth of another peace initiative, which was the first one ever 
since the Addis Ababa agreement in the 1970s with an important role played by regional states 
and organizations. This resulted in the DoP, which introduced the idea of a referendum on 
independence to be granted to the South. Although it was not accepted by the North, this was an 
important stride since it has officially put the idea of an independence referendum as a 
negotiation agenda which united the South. This initiative and its provisions are later adopted in 
the Machakos protocol which has come to be the main blueprint of the CPA which will be 
discussed further below. After the failure of the DoP of ending the civil war several external and 
internal factors resulted in a stalemate between the parties, that eventually led to negotiations that 
resulted in the Machakos Protocol, and eventually the CPA bringing an end to the Sudanese civil 
war.  
2.1 Declaration of Principles 
A peace initiative was initiated by the IGAD in the early 1990s. The IGAD was an 
organization of states of the Horn of Africa. IGAD was one of the early organizations that have 
attempted a Sudanese peace initiative in 1993 which was Kenyan-led. This was the longest-
running peace initiative and was the one that has gained attention and support from international 
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actors which eventually led to the formation of the CPA. The main purpose of the IGAD was to 
deal with issues of drought and desertification however in the early 1990s, due to the largely 
destabilizing conflict in Sudan it has decided to manage issues that are related to conflict 
prevention.  
One of the main reasons why the IGAD adopted a conflict resolution agenda in the early 
1990s, was due to the suffering of the neighboring countries who are also members of the IGAD, 
from the destabilization of the region due to the Sudan war. The neighboring countries such as 
Ethiopia pushed for peace since they could no longer aid Sudan and wanted to focus more on their 
internal affairs, with Eritrea attempting to secede from them. Furthermore, countries like Kenya 
and Uganda feared the expansionist ideas of the new Islamist power in Khartoum; “Thus, the 
regional dynamics of the civil war in Sudan were largely responsible for IGADD adopting a 
conflict resolution stature and activating a mediation agenda.”169  
The IGAD founded the Peace Committee with the then Kenyan President Arap Moi as a 
chair and included the heads of states of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.170 Only a year after the 
IGAD has taken over the peace process, there was a breakthrough in 1994 in Nairobi where the 
DoP was produced.171 The IGAD drafted the DoP with the backdrop of the referendum held in 
Eritrea in 1993 which brought them their independence. Hence the main component of the DoP 
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was either equal power and wealth sharing between the North and South and secularization or the 
South could have the right to self-determination through a referendum.172  
This principle was agreed upon and accepted by the two SPLM/A factions (mainstream 
and united). The two factions saw that despite their differences, they had a common enemy i.e. the 
GoS. Furthermore, the DoP was emerging when the South was reaching great strides on 
reconciliation amongst each other which will be discussed further below. The power parity 
between the rebels and the GoS was at the extreme asymmetry level where the GoS had a favorable 
advantage militarily. Hence, they saw that they had bigger leverage on the southern rebels and 
therefore had little incentive to negotiate let alone concede to these principles laid out by the 
IGAD.173 Moreover, conceding to the principles would undermine their ambitions of making 
Khartoum into a center of international Islamism. Hence, the war still continued until negotiations 
and progress towards peace started again in the early 2000s.    
2.2 Ripeness 
The IGAD resurfaced again as the main mediator by restarting serious negotiations in 
2002 in Kenya. The ripeness of the moment was a very important factor for the initiation of the 
peace process that resulted in the CPA. First of all, both parties have reached a hurting stalemate 
which resulted in both of them committing to an internationally monitored ceasefire on 
November 2001. Due to several internal pressures that the North was facing such as the Darfur 
rebellion and unity of the South was starting to affect the North’s war-weary soldiers; the North 
started realizing that they are spread too thinly between two wars (South and Darfur). As for the 
South, the states that initially were aiding them with weapons and allowing their grounds for 
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military bases were not willing to aid them anymore hence, the best solution is to opt for peace. 
Furthermore, several external factors have pushed both the sides to be willing to commence 
talks. The peace process started gaining international attention and pressure to end this conflict. 
This is because of the U.S.’s new adopted policy namely ‘The War on Terror’ post 9/11, hence 
the first ever U.S. special envoy was appointed to deal with the Sudanese conflict.174 This 
resulted in having new mediators on the table with the appointment of General Sumbeiywo by 
President Moi as well as former U.S. senator John Danforth. These new mediators as well as the 
new dynamic of the world that changed post 9/11 has led to a new trajectory of the peace 
process.175 
Although there were attempts from regional states to establish peace processes such as 
the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative calling for unity, they were to no avail. Moreover, the 
Friends of IGAD (Canada, Italy, UK, Norway, U.S.) were realizing that the structure and process 
that the IGAD is pursuing will not lead to any result.176 Although the Friends of IGAD were an 
important part of the process they showed little interest in engaging with the SPLA or the 
National Democratic alliance that formed to oppose Bashir’s take of power. Evidently all of 
these different approaches and initiatives for a peace process have failed and no progress was 
made by the end of 2001. Hence, the Troika (U.S., Norway, U.K.) involved themselves even 
more especially with the new focus of the U.S. on the conflict, hence they pushed the IGAD to 
adopt a new peace process initiative.  
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2.2.1 External pressure 
The appointment of Senator John Danforth, was the first time the U.S. has sent a special 
envoy to deal with the Sudanese conflict which increased international pressure on finding a 
solution to the conflict. U.S. increased involvement in the peace process was one of the main 
external factors that pushed the North to sit on the negotiating table. For the North it was the 
feared pressure from the U.S. from their new adopted policy War on terror mentioned above. It 
was within U.S.’s security interest to curb the Islamists in Sudan therefore, the U.S. sometimes 
threatened to use military power, and would support the SPLM/A against the National Congress 
Party (NCP) which was the ruling political party in the North. The NCP was also motivated to 
engage in the process now that the U.S. is a part of it in order to get rid of its pariah status after 
harboring terrorists like Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s as well as hosting al Qaeda training 
camps.177 Furthermore, the U.S. congress had pressure on Khartoum in case it obstructs the 
peace process due to the Sudan Peace Act which imposes on them sanctions.   
The external pressures on the SPLM/A were of a different character. The SPLM/A had 
both regional support/pressure from Kenya, Eritrea, Uganda, and Ethiopia as well as 
international support most importantly from the U.S. With Khartoum’s support of the domestic 
opposition in the neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda it pushed them to 
support the SPLM/A and wanted to see an end to this conflict.178 As for the U.S., the liberals 
sympathized with Garang’s calls for secession and it is this sympathy that encouraged the 
SPLM/A to take part in the peace process since they have the attention of the biggest western 
country which could help pressurize the North and get more concessions from them; “Both the 
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domestic balance of power and pattern of regional support therefore tilted in favour of the 
SPLM/A, increasing the likelihood that it could extract concessions from the NCP.”179   
2.2.2 Internal pressure   
The external pressure, especially the U.S. War on Terror, came at a time where the 
Sudanese government – which was considered the most powerful actor in the conflict – was facing 
struggles to keep its power legitimate in the North while it was threatened by the Islamic hardliners 
as well as fighting and containing the rebellion in Darfur in the West. 180 There was also internal 
strife within the GoS between Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi who was the leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, which led to him being side-lined. The sidelining of al-Turabi led 
the way to pragmatists such as Ali Osman Taha, who eventually was the main representative of 
Sudan in the negotiating table with Garang which resulted in the CPA. 181  
Moreover, the Southerners have already dealt with their own differences through the 
People-to-People process. Had it not been for this process and conference, there would not have 
been peace amongst the South Sudanese and consequently no peace between the North and 
South without the pressure of their unity and power on the North.182 It was a combination of 
regional and international countries and NGOs that have dedicated their financial and human 
capabilities to this particular reconciliation process. A series of conferences were organized by 
the Norwegian Church Aid and a few NGOs to help with reconciliations between the 
Southerners. The conferences usually gathered local people, fighters and commanders, elders, 
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pastors, and generally interested individuals in the issue.  These conferences were recurring in a 
large number in most areas of South Sudan, which has allowed for all warring factions in the 
South to agree on a common agenda and statements on the future of the South which was mainly 
advocating the right of self-determination for the South as well as other marginalized areas; 
“According to a comprehensive New Sudan Council of Churches publication, 16 major 
conferences and 14 mini-conferences brought together thousands of people from 1997 to 
2003.”183 Hence, Khartoum decided to participate in the peace process in order to survive from 
both internal and external pressures that they were facing, which broke the long-standing 
stalemate and initiated the relaunching of negotiations in May 2002.  
This pressure from the unity of the SPLM/A was one of the main factors that encouraged 
the South to sit and take part in the peace process and this was evident ever since 1994 with the 
acceptance of the DoP discussed above. The National Democratic Alliance which the SPLM/A 
was leading, made them the official representatives of the whole South Sudan as well as of the 
three contested areas of the conflict namely, Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Southern Blue 
Nile.184 Another internal factor that encouraged the South to negotiate a settlement was when the 
SPLM/A lost their operational base in Ethiopia after Khartoum based rebels overthrew the 
Ethiopian Mengistu regime whom also provided financial and military support to the South. 
Garang realized that their heavy dependency on external support could not sustain an open-ended 
war after their loss of their main operational base.185  
2.3 Reinitiating of Peace Process      
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After the commitment of both parties to the ceasefire in 2001 mentioned above in the 
ripeness section, in April 2002 the Troika believed that both parties showed willingness and 
commitment to a peace process.186 This combination of the three states was great since there 
were two global powers with global credibility (U.S. and U.K.) and Norway although considered 
to be a small country has a reputation for their role in the Oslo process between Israel and 
Palestine. The main approach that these three countries have decided on is to formally be a part 
of the negotiation process as observers in order to support the IGAD.  Form early 2002 the 
Troika would provide financial and technical support as well as form joint political pressure on 
the parties in the negotiation. Furthermore,  they would have the title of observers, and some of 
their roles as observers include, “… advise the work of Special Envoy Sumbeiywo, with the 
parties, serve as the main organizers of leverage, and coordinate international strategy.”187 The 
role of the observers is second in tier to the parties and the IGAD represented by General 
Sumbeiy.  
General Sumbeiywo was the former chief of staff of the Kenyan Arm. He was not the 
expected person to give this role to especially since he was a military man and does not have 
professional background in diplomacy. However, he was considered to be a neutral and unbiased 
mediator since the GoS did not want to accept the U.S. as a mediator since Sudan is listed as a 
state that sponsors terrorism by the U.S. Furthermore, the South Sudanese did not trust the 
British as they were pushing for the unity of Sudan over the independence of South Sudan.188  He 
was a strong mediator that did not care about angering any of the observer powerful countries at 
the negotiating table. Furthermore, he was a mediator that was not only familiar with the history 
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of the country but also is aware of the cultural values that he used for consensus building. He 
believed that the U.S. and British support was necessary for the negotiations however in the right 
time and context; “The newly organized mediators became major catalysts in producing the 
watershed Machakos Protocol at the end of July 2002.” 189    
2.3.1 Machakos Protocol  
The momentous Machakos Protocol, was signed on 20 July 2002, with the mediation by 
the IGAD chief mediator general Sumbeiyowo, which prepared the ground for the 9 January 
2005 CPA.190 The Machakos Protocol was seen as only the beginning of  a long peace process; 
however, it was a very important start which led to five successful negotiations regarding 
security arrangements in the interim period, including issues of wealth and government power 
sharing; “The parties also accepted that Machakos…marked not the end of the process but the 
beginning of the serious, detailed negotiations.”191   
The Machakos Protocol was not majorly different than that of IGAD’s DoP in 1994, 
however with the exception of the establishment of a secular Sudan. The balance that the 
Machakos Protocol provided was that the North will get to have Sharia as the basis for their law 
in return for the South to have a chance to gain self-determination through a referendum. It is 
made clear that the Sudanese national constitution is subject to amendments before the interim 
period in order to include the elements agreed on in the peace agreement. Another provision 
provided is the exemption of South Sudan from legislation based on the Sharia, and that the 
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constitution must take in to account the diversity in Sudan.192 Hence, the Machakos protocol 
offers a quasi-confederal union between North and South by having an interim period for six 
years.193 The protocol laid out provisions for the ending of the conflict with Sudan still united, 
however with more equal distribution of power-sharing, freedom of religion, and finally the most 
important provision, the referendum which is to be held in the South after a six- year interim 
period. By October 2002, another agreement was signed for the ceasing of hostilities which was 
supported and strengthened by another agreement in February 2003, which set out the formation 
of the Verification monitoring Team in order to supervise the ceasefire.194However, an attack by 
the SPLM/A on the Southern town of Torit a few months after the signing of the protocol has 
temporarily halted the peace process. Although there has been fighting during the peace process, 
this was different since it occurred after so much important progress has been already made.195 
This eventually led to the GoS to abandon the Machakos protocol and asked for a ceasefire until 
they were able to gain back Torit.  
Eventually, negotiations were back on track this time discussing the three contested areas 
i.e. the Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and the Southern Blue Nile. At some point the mediators wanted 
to intensify the peace process and reach a settlement sooner. The U.S. even abandoned the 
piecemeal approach and instead presented a draft of a comprehensive agreement, known as the 
Nakuru document. However, this document was rejected by the GoS because of some of security 
arrangements that they did not agree with. Due to the Nakuru document which put the 
negotiations in a deadlock, high-level talks were necessary if any agreement was to be reached. 
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The mediation through the IGAD secretariat has been halted and instead the focus was on more 
direct negotiations between John Garang and the vice president of the NCP Ali Osman Taha.196   
During the direct negotiations in 2003, they came to an understanding on security 
arrangements, wealth sharing, and quotas on power-sharing that will be discussed further in the 
next section below. The last part of the negotiations was to discuss the implementation schedule 
of the CPA and work on details of a cease-fire agreement. The last few negotiations have 
dragged long in 2004 due to several reasons. One of the main events that were blamed for this 
delay is that the North was too focused on its offensives in Darfur. There has also been the issue 
of dissent within the SPLM/A on the way they have handled the negotiations that caused a halt to 
the peace negotiations. Eventually, a UN Security Council (SC) meeting was held in November 
2004 in Nairobi in which they gave both parties and ultimatum to reach an agreement by the end 
of the year on December 31, 2004 or face consequences from the international community.197  
3. CPA  
 Finally, the CPA was signed on January 9, 2005. The CPA set out certain provisions and 
two of the most important issues tackled are: (1) territorial integrity of Sudan (2) Southern 
grievances of political, economic and social discrimination. The CPA emphasizes that the unity 
of Sudan should be a priority for all parties of the agreement as stipulated in chapter 1 part A 1.1 
– namely, “[t]hat the unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people democratic 
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governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of the Sudan is and shall 
be the priority of the Parties.”198  
The main premise of the agreement is that the North should work on making the unity of 
Sudan attractive enough for the Southerners. Hence, the agreement also stipulates in chapter 2 
part 2-2.5 the creation of the Government of National Unity (GoNU) which is a joint government 
unit between the SPLM/A and the NCP. The CPA stipulates that both parties should have equal 
power share in the government therefore allowing the South 80% of seats in the national 
legislature. The NCP is still slightly more power retaining a veto, has two-thirds share in the 
presidency, and 52% of the seats in the National Assembly; “The SPLM’s share in national 
institutions is 28%, and the remaining 20% is divided between opposition parties.” 199  This joint 
government will be following the Interim National Constitution which is a legalized version of 
the CPA.    
Another important provision was the exemption of South Sudan from legislation based on 
Sharia law. The CPA also stipulates in chapter 2 part 3-3.2, the creation of the autonomous 
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with its capital in Juba and led by John Garang who was 
also the first vice president of all of Sudan.200 The GoSS would form its own committee to draft 
their own constitution that is based on their customary laws201 As for the wealth-sharing 
provisions, what was agreed was that the income from the oil would be split in half with each of 
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them taking 50%.202 However, the main important issues such as ownership of natural resources 
such as the Nile water was completely ignored and the issues of land ownership were postponed. 
Certain security arrangements and provisions were laid out as well and the most important was 
stipulated in chapter 5 number 6. As there is a joint government there will also be a joint arm 
force known as the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) made up of SPLA and Sudan’s Armed Force 
(SAF). This was a particularly important provision as well since the South has learnt from its 
mistake in the Addis Ababa arrangement where they were left with no armed force and instead 
were integrated into the national army. This new security arrangement in the CPA illustrates that 
both the North and South have joint sovereignty in the interim period.203  
Finally, the most important provision to the South is the referendum provision that was to 
be held at the end of the interim period in 2011. This is stipulated in chapter 1 part A  article 1.3, 
“That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a 
referendum to determine their future status.”204 Chapter 1 part B article  2.5,  specifically 
stipulates the subject of the referendum; “At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall 
be an internationally monitored referendum…for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity 
of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace 
Agreement; or to vote for secession.”205 The threshold established for the referendum to be 
legitimate was that at least 60 percent of the registered voters had to cast their votes. The CPA 
set a specified timeline that Sudan had to follow to organize the referendum. It was stipulated 
that the South Sudan Referendum Act (SSRA) should be adopted at the end of the third year of 
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the interim period. The CPA also stipulates the formation of the South Sudan Referendum 
Commission (SSRC) which organizes anything that has to do with the referendum including 
establishing rules, regulations and policies of conducting a referendum in Sudan and in other 
countries with a high number of a South Sudan diaspora.  The SSRC be established after the 
enactment of the SSRA and the registration of voters should start at the beginning of the last year 
of the interim period and should have ended three months before voting begins.206   
One of the main criticisms regarding the CPA is that while it did discuss an array of issues 
between the parties it did putt off very important issues such as the three contested areas: Nuba 
Mountains, Abyei, and the Southern Blue Nile and what their futures are. Only the Abyei region 
was discussed and it was agreed that they will also go through a referendum simultaneously with 
the South Sudanese referendum. However, chapter 4 1.3 stipulates that the Abyei referendum is 
to decide whether they are a part of the north or the South and not for secession; “Simultaneously 
with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The 
proposition voted on…will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices…: a. That 
Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north; b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el 
Ghazal.”207  
3.1 Incentives   
Most of the incentives for the NCP and the SPLM/A to come to an agreement and sign 
the CPA are very similar to the main external reasons why they even sat on the table to negotiate.  
The main incentive given to the GoS to accept all provisions of the CPA especially the provision 
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on the referendum is the promise that the US-Sudan relation will strengthen and improve208. As 
for Garang, the U.S. was one of the main supporters of SPLM/A and wanted to maintain these 
close ties with the U.S. in order to have their backing in the negotiations and aid them in post-
conflict reconstruction of the south.  
 Although the CPA did not recognize the secession of South Sudan, it did promise a 
referendum to be held after six years. The provision for a postponed referendum on 
independence is given to the South as a possible exit should the autonomy arrangements not 
satisfy them enough at the end of the interim period. This was also a way for the NCP to right 
their wrongs by sharing power and wealth fairly and equally in order to gain the Southerners’ 
trust back and therefore convince them to opt for unity rather than independence.209 Another 
reason for the referendum being a costly from the GoS, was the fear they had that the South 
Sudan example would entice other rebellious regions of Sudan pressuring it for secession, 
including Western Darfur. This was also considered a costly signal since the provision not only 
threatens their territorial integrity but goes against the main goal of the NCP, whose legitimacy is 
based on expanding and advancing Islamic principles.210  
If it was not for the costly signal and concession of the GoS on the issue of the 
referendum, there would not be any peace agreement between the North and South; “Southern 
Sudan’s self-determination referendum was the cornerstone and conclusion of the CPA, and 
probably the single non-negotiable component of the agreement for southerners.”211 The 
possibility of Southern independence serves as a ‘double-edged sword’ for the South as well. For 
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the South, the Dinka SPLM/A could face rebellions from other southern tribes such as the Nuer 
and the Equatorian tribes that have traditionally been complaining about Dinka dominance.212 
However, the fear of the South of these rebellions faded away after the reconciliation process 
that they went through mentioned in the above sections.  
The main costly signal on behalf of the South was having a political partnership with the 
NCP and Vice President Taha and committing themselves to working for the unity of Sudan.213 
Finally, for the South, the legalization of the CPA and its adoption into the constitution was also 
another important guarantee for them and a great costly signal on behalf of the NCP.214 The 
referendum was also assessed against the, “…  the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the 
Southern Sudan Referendum Act (SSRA or Referendum Act) of 2010, and other national laws, 
as well as Sudan’s international treaty obligations, including the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).”215  
4. Implementation History: 5 Years         
After the signing of the CPA, there was an immediate move on drafting and amending the 
new constitution for Sudan in order to include the provisions agreed upon in the CPA. Although 
the CPA has done its job at halting the war and preventing it from recurring once again, it was 
still a suboptimal agreement. There was still great violence in the South, moreover the CPA was 
not implemented smoothly and its implementation was often halted.216 Furthermore, the CPA 
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was not implemented fully but only the provisions that each party prioritized were focused on. 
For the South it was the referendum which was non-negotiable. As for the North it was the 2010 
elections especially after the indictment of Bashir by the ICC since the NCP wants him to have 
the image of being popularly elected in front of the international world.217  
One of the main events that threatened the maintenance of peace in Sudan and the 
weakening of the CPA was the sudden death of Garang only three weeks after the signing of the 
CPA.218 It is from that time where the drawback of the CPA’s sole reliance on the goodwill of 
the leaders was apparent.219 Furthermore, after his successor Salva Kiir came into power, the 
relations between the North and the South weakened especially since he did not care to work for 
the unity of Sudan as Garang did and focused more on uniting the South and prepare for 
secession. Hence, the power of the South in the national institutions of Sudan was weakening 
and there were also some issues of the NCP withholding oil revenue shares from the South, 
which resulted in the South refusing to participate in these institutions anymore in 2007. 220 This 
crisis caused an issue in the possible delay of the presidential elections that were to be held in 
2009 however, this was not the only event/issue which threatened the timeline of the elections.  
When it comes to the implementation of the CPA, every provision is linked to a highly 
interlinked process in order for it to succeed. In order for the presidential elections to have been 
held by July 2009 as stipulated in Chapter 2 part 1 paragraph 1.8.3 there were a number of 
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conditions to be fulfilled in order to hold them: (1) border demarcation between North and South 
on July 2005, (2) formation and adoption of an electoral law that also guarantees freedom of 
expression early 2006 and creation of National Electoral commission, (3) census completed by 
July 2007.221 However, by the time it was 2009 a census was still not done or finished. All of 
these conditions were pushed aside until 2008 with little to no progress. The electoral law and 
the NEC were both established by November 2008.  Moreover, issues such as the demarcation of 
the borders was avoided for fear of the recurrence of violence since a small variation in it can 
affect revenue distribution between the North and the South. 222  
Despite all of these complications and putting off of important issues, the parliamentary 
and presidential elections were finally held in April 2010, in which the NCP and SPLM/A came 
to a mutual understanding that they would not challenge or oppose each other’s positions in each 
of their regions. The presidential elections that were held fell short of the international standards 
since these elections were meant to include the rest of Sudan that were not part of the singing of 
the CPA. The elections resulted in further consolidating the NCP’s power in the North and did 
not allow any chance for any opposition, “Nonetheless, the elections were considered a key 
benchmark in the CPA and allowed for the remaining provisions of the agreement to be 
implemented.”223 During the time when elections were being prepared for, the South was ready 
to even have an alliance with the NCP as long as they can guarantee that the referendum will not 
be postponed. They saw it irrelevant for them to be helping and setting up the center of the 
country i.e. the North when they should be planning for their independence.224  
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Although there was a stifling on the discussion of possible secession arrangements, Salva 
Kiir has worked on uniting all the separate ethnicities and groups in the South even when they 
are not a part of the SPLM/A in order to ensure independence when the referendum comes. 
Furthermore, it was believed that discussing secession defeats the whole purpose of the CPA in 
which the agreement emphasizes the promotion of unity and both sides of the parties are obliged 
to promote unity.225 Only a year before the holding of the referendum were certain arrangements 
of secession discussed. This put the organizers of the referendum in a very difficult situation 
since they had to deal with so many technicalities with the organization of the referendum in 
such a short time. Although this frustrated the Southerners, they tolerated the delays and non-
compliance of the North with the deadlines stipulated in the CPA since their goal (independence) 
was very near and did not want to cause further delays in order to hold the referendum on 
time.226  
The CPA had a specified timeline that Sudan had to follow to organize the referendum. It 
was stipulated that the SSRA should be adopted at the end of the third year of the interim period. 
As for the SSRC it should have been established after the act and the registration of voters 
should have started at the beginning of the last year of the interim period. However, the act was 
enacted only at the end of 2009, while the SSRC was established at the end of June 2010 and was 
only operational by September. This gave the new commission only four months to organize the 
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technicalities such as setting up referendum centers, training staff, registering voters, conduct 
voter education etc.227 
Around the time of the referendum, both the NCP and SPLM/A had a common goal – 
which was to avoid the recurrence of war for different reasons. First of all, the NCP wanted to 
remain in power in the North especially after the indictment of Al Bashir by the ICC on his 
actions in Darfur. Second of all, if war reoccurs it could cause further isolation to Sudan from the 
international community which could further weaken its economy and military and eventually 
the NCP’s hold of power. As for the SPLM/A, all they wanted is a peaceful and orderly 
secession from North Sudan.228 In the year and few months that were leading up to the 
referendum, Sudan has experienced lower violence in 2010 than in 2009 and 2011229, which goes 
to show how important and crucial the referendum was.   
Bashir was even very vocal in his acceptance of whatever the result may be for the 
referendum, especially in his speech in Juba on January 4, 2011. The South even pushed 
themselves to restrain themselves from several provocations from the North where the SAF have 
sent several bombs along the north-south border only a few weeks before the referendum. The 
South decided not to retaliate militarily since the holding of the referendum is the most important 
event.  The referendum was finally held on January 9, 2011 and voting closed on January 15. 
The final result was announced on February 7, 2011, “… Of the 3 851 994 who voted 3 792 518, 
representing 98.8 per cent of Southern Sudanese voters, opted for secession.”230 
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5. Regional and International Intervention 
The regional intervention by the IGAD played a substantive role in the peace process 
since it was in the DoP where the first mention of a referendum was declared officially. From the 
Machakos protocol to the post-referendum period, the international community has also played a 
decisive role in the peace process and post-conflict development of Sudan. Most of the analysts 
of the time as well as the International Crisis Group have reported that external catalysts were the 
key to all of these progresses and that if it was left to the Sudanese there was little hope for 
success.231 It was the direct and intimate involvement of the observers in the talks with the close 
support to the Kenyan Special Envoy in developing positions that has facilitated the great 
progress in forming a peace settlement. 
The CPA itself has laid out several monitoring mechanisms and groups in order to 
monitor the implementation of the agreement. For peacekeeping, the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) was held responsible. As for the overall monitoring of the implementation of 
the CPA commission named the International Assessment and Evaluation Commission was 
responsible. The commission included representatives from the NCP, SPLM/A, IGAD (Kenya 
and Ethiopia), along with the Friends of IGAD. At the beginning of its formation, the Norwegian 
representative was its chair.232 The CPA also specifically stipulates in Chapter 1-The Right to 
Self-Determination For The People Of South Sudan 2.5 that, “ …there shall be an internationally 
monitored referendum.”233  The U.S. and the other international mediators involved in the 
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negotiation are the ones that have given an added legitimacy to the referendum.234 This 
international presence helped encourage mutual trust and cooperation, especially since both 
parties would not want the international community at some point to criticize them or be blamed 
if they were going to break a promise or provision.235  
The CPC was formed as a decision-making body that provides a forum for dialogue and 
settling disputes. It was inclusive of all relevant parties such as representatives from the SPLM/A 
and the Sudanese government. There was the inclusion of regional and international 
representatives as well such as IGAD and the UN Special Representative or his deputy. Another 
major intervention by the UN in the Sudanese conflict especially in the post-conflict period is the 
issuance of several resolutions that call on both parties to resolve the status of Abyei.236 
However, many analysts have mentioned that the Darfur crisis has strayed the attention of the 
international community away from the CPA and its implementation in the first few years after 
the signing; “The Darfur crisis has split the attention of many of the CPA’s international 
supporters and this has limited the effectiveness of their diplomacy and contributed to a situation 
where some necessary but ambitious parts of the agreement are being delayed or avoided.” 237 
Another criticism, which is a common one amongst international peacebuilders is that they were 
too focused only on the macro-level political divide between the NCP and SPLM/A. Their main 
focus was only the implementation of the CPA, and any of the local conflicts that were occurring 
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in the South were ignored and were seen as an issue to be worked around and focus more on the 
holding of the elections as well as the referendum on secession.238 
This is indeed what happened, in which the international community were focused again 
on the North and the South when it came to the implementation of the presidential elections and 
more importantly the referendum. During the period leading up to the holding of the referendum, 
Obama and Hillary Clinton have discussed and voiced their opinions on the sensitivity and 
importance of the referendum; “Warning within the U.S. government is mainly the province of 
the intelligence community, and warnings are thus rarely issued openly. In the case of Sudan, 
however, multiple senior U.S. government officials made public statements expressing concern 
about the risk of major violence around the referendum.”239 The former vice-president Joe Biden 
even had a meeting with Kirr in Nairobi discussing the kinds of standards and expectations that 
the U.S. has for the referendum process. As mentioned above it was only in 2010 where 
arrangements for the holding of the referendum started to occur. A small process of negotiation 
on post-CPA arrangements started with the facilitation of the U.S. and Ethiopia. After a high-
level meeting in the UN which was organized by then Secretary general ban Ki-Moon was held 
on September 24, 2010 the international world encouraged and emphasized the importance of the 
holding of the referendum on time with no delays.240  
With this great focus on the issue, none of the parties could even think of backing out or 
causing any harm to the process especially the NCP. It was also the incentives that the U.S. had 
presented to the North in September 2010 in the UN meeting on the normalization of political 
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relations between them as well as debt relief promises that have mainly encouraged the North to 
abide by the holding of the referendum on time and even accepting the results whatever they 
maybe. 241 In the Sudan case it was the great balance and power between the regional and 
international intervention that resulted in a peaceful and successful holding of the referendum; 
African problems have African solutions . . . when buttressed by international support…. 
The effectiveness of African leadership […] still depended on broader international 
support, especially from the major powers with the ability to bring pressures and 
incentives to bear. Had Africa leaned one way and much of the international community 
another way, the result could have been disastrous.242  
6. Conclusion   
 Understanding the history of the grievance of the South as well as retracing the peace 
process illustrates the importance of the referendum provision to the making or breaking of the 
CPA and also peace between the North and the South.  No matter what other provisions were 
halted or delayed the most important provision that could not have be ignored is the referendum. 
It has already, “… gathered too much historical and political momentum to be stalled by the 
peace agreement.”243 The idea of separation has been in the South Sudanese minds since the 
1950s after the independence of Sudan from the British. This was further solidified with the two 
civil wars that they have gone through as well as witnessing the NCP delaying and halting the 
implementation of certain provisions of the CPA has made the idea of unity with the North 
unattractive during the interim period.   
 Furthermore, the sudden death of Garang has exposed the weaknesses of the CPA and of 
the commitment by both sides to its implementation. Another issue with the CPA is that was not 
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considered to be a ‘well-designed’ agreement. While it did discuss an array of issues between the 
parties it did putt off very important issues such as the Abyei area, oil transit fees, security 
arrangements on how to deal with the rebels along the borders of both Sudanese states etc.244 
However, it was due to the ripeness of the moments and the context that the CPA was being 
drafted in as well as the various incentives internally and externally mentioned above that pushed 
both parties to negotiate an agreement and abide by its most important provisions. Moreover, the 
various protocols that were formed the most prominent of them being the Machakos Protocol 
established the overall architecture of the CPA.   
 Finally, the great role that the regional and international actors played during the peace 
process and negotiations as well as post-conflict was the main reason why the referendum was 
able to be held on time and in a peaceful manner. It was the great effort of the international 
community on emphasizing the importance of the referendum and even participating in the 
preparations of the referendum by providing financial support and trainings to the staff.245 The 
regional actors especially the IGAD with the leading mediator General Sumbeiyw also played a 
great role in changing the trajectory of the peace process in 2002. General Sumbeiyw was also 
able to balance out international intervention and trying his best in making the process and 
negotiations as African as possible especially with his familiarity and expertise on the culture 
and history of Sudan. With all of these factors mentioned, the referendum provision became the 
center of the whole peace process and CPA, since without its presence as a provision in the first 
place the Sudanese civil war could have been continuing to this day.    
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East Timor has been struggling for independence ever since the 1970s after Indonesia’s 
occupation. What sets off the East Timor case in particular compared to the other two cases of 
the thesis is the timing of the holding of the referendum, as well as the extensive UN intervention 
that it had experienced. Another major difference in this case is that the provision of the 
referendum was not a result of negotiations or peace process but is due to the pressure of 
regional countries such as Australia and several western countries which led to President Habibie 
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to make a unilateral announcement on the option of a referendum on independence. The context 
of the political environment was also an important factor that changed Indonesia’s policy 
towards East Timor with the Asian financial crisis that they were facing. Moreover, with the fall 
of the USSR and communism, the western countries that were once on Indonesia’s side during 
the Cold War era started to pressure and condemn the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia.  
The peace agreement was only drafted and implemented in a few months, and scheduled 
the referendum on independence only after two months of the signing of the agreement. East 
Timor had caused the UN to experience and implement unprecedented mandates, the most 
important one being the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 
which the de facto ruler of East Timor was a UN diplomat for two years. The UNTAET was 
given a short time to be able to build a stable country with enough capacity to rule itself with the 
deadline of only two years to East Timor’s independence. The issue of timing and the experience 
of the UN will be discussed as well as the major incentives and costly signals at the time that 
resulted in the formation of a peace agreement that resulted in the eventual independence of East 
Timor.     
1.  Background   
East Timor is a small tropical island that is part of the Indonesian archipelago of the 
Lesser Sunda Islands, which is located around 400 miles north of Australia. Timor is situated 
towards the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. At first, Portugal occupied the entire 
island of Timor, until the rival colonial power at the time, the Dutch, came to occupy the western 
part in 1895.247 The Dutch withdrew from West Timor soon after World War II, which was 
integrated into Indonesia upon its independence in 1949 from the Dutch. East Timor’s path to 
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independence has been on the agenda of the UN ever since 1960 when it was declared a non-
self-governing territory since it fell under the Geneal Assembly (GA) Resolution to Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.248 However, East Timor remained under 
Portuguese control until 1975.  
1.1 Indonesian Occupation 
After the military coup that occurred in Portugal in 1974 that overthrew Salazar’s fascist 
regime, a rapid process of decolonization occurred.249 Portugal wanted to form an interim 
government and popular assembly that could deal with the future status of East Timor. Hence, 
the question of East Timor’s independence was brought to light, which resulted in the emergence 
of three major political groups in East Timor – each one with different agendas. The Democratic 
Union of Timorese (UDT) was formed by a group of administrative elites who have been 
benefiting from the colonization of Portugal, therefore their goal was for East Timor to be bound 
to a loose federation of former Portuguese colonies. The second party was the Popular 
Democratic Association of Timorese (APODETI) who favored integration with Indonesia. 
Finally, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) called for the 
independence of East Timor. At some point, the UDT and the Fretilin formed a coalition to reach 
a compromise on the decolonization phase of East Timor. However, this coalition broke down 
and resulted in a three-week civil war between those two parties which was won by the Fretilin 
on August 1975.250 The Portuguese had made it clear after this short outbreak that they will no 
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longer rule this colony and that they will withdraw, which made the Fretilin the de facto rulers of 
East Timor.   
The UDT and Indonesia had attempted several incursions in October and November of 1975, 
on East Timor however on November 28, 1975 the Fretilin declared the independence of East 
Timor.251 This was short lived since Indonesia occupied East Timor on December 7, 1975. In 
July 1976, East Timor was officially announced as the 27th province of Indonesia, which marked 
the beginning of the 24-year long guerilla war between the Fretilin and the Indonesia army. The 
official justification for Indonesia’s invasion was to liberate the Timorese with the assistance of 
APODETI and UDT from the Fretilin.252 On the other hand, the decision of Indonesia to occupy 
East Timor was based on security fears mostly especially from a regime that is obsessed with 
anti-communism.253 
The Fretilin who were de facto rulers of East Timor after the withdrawal of Portugal were 
portrayed as a Marxist-inspired party254 moreover, they were advocating for independence and 
even unilaterally announced their independence. The U.S. and Australia were aware of 
Indonesia’s intentions of occupying East Timor. At the time, a powerful emerging power in Asia 
as well as an ally to them during the Cold War with the anti-communist regime ruling Indonesia 
was more important to them than issues of self-determination.255 The U.S. did not want to see a 
new left-wing threat emerging in Southeast Asia when they already have Vietnam to deal with; 
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“… another Vietnam War in a neighbouring area was a nightmare for both Indonesia and 
Australia, as well as for a more distant United States.”256  
The annexation of East Timor was largely condemned by the international community, with 
the GA and the SC passing numerous resolutions from 1975 to 1982 calling on the withdrawal of 
Indonesia from East Timor, including United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 384 
and 389. What these resolutions fell short of was illustrating to Indonesia the consequences that 
they could face if they did not withdraw since there was no way to force them to leave East 
Timor.257 
Although the question of East Timor has been on the agenda at the regional and international 
levels since the 1980s not much action has been taken. Most pressure from states was, mainly 
symbolic. Many of the human rights violations that Indonesia has committed such as torturing, 
killing, and imprisoning political opposition, “… did not elicit concrete international pressure on 
the Indonesian government to end them until very recently.”258Although there have been several 
calls from the GA to the SC to consider taking some actions in 1982, the SC never saw the East 
Timorese issue as a threat to international peace. Furthermore, so long as the cold war continued, 
the Western countries would prevent any kind of pressure from the UN, since the Jakarta regime 
was headed by an anti-communist general.259   
2. Ripeness   
Despite the start of negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the 
UN since 1983, there was very little progress even after the Timorese issue had regained 
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attention from the international community.260 According to Alexander Downer – the Australian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, “ In reality, there was nothing inevitable about any of 
this. The events that led the East Timorese on the path to independence involved a more complex 
and less clear-cut process than hindsight might suggest.”261 One of the key events that triggered a 
transformation in the politics of Indonesia is the 1997 Asian financial crisis that has resulted in 
the downfall of President Suharto. There was a wave of a call of new reforms a “New Order”, 
and amongst them was the advocation of the formation of a federal structure and also at another 
extreme calling for the secession of some of the regions in the outer islands such as East Timor, 
Aceh, Irian etc.262 President Suharto, was succeeded by President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. 
When he first took office, he was very vocal that he will not accept any discussion on the 
independence of East Timor, however he did announce on June 1998 that he would grant them 
special autonomy.263   
President Habibie’s announcement signaled an important shift in Indonesia’s policy towards 
East Timor. Since his popularity and power were weak in Indonesia at the time, he believed that 
this will strengthen his position for the next Presidency election, if he achieved a solution to this 
long-standing East Timorese issue.264 Moreover, Indonesia was incapable of handling East 
Timor anymore since they invested a lot of human and financial resources to the territory. The 
Indonesian government no longer had a united opinion on the issue of East Timor, with some 
officials seeing that getting rid of East Timor could be a great economic burden taken off of 
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Indonesia.265 Several Jakarta-based activists took the opportunity of the changing political 
climate in Indonesia and were more vocal on the need to resolve the issue of East Timor. There 
was a holding of a seminar in July 1998 to discuss ways for the peaceful resolution of the East 
Timor issue and the participants of this seminar included the East Timorese; “…a similar 
gathering and discussion would have been unheard of in Jakarta only a few months earlier.”266 
This announcement of autonomy was not only the result of the internal political and 
economic changes but Indonesia was also concerned by the determination and large scale of 
international support and attention that the East Timor crisis has gained. The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which Indonesia is a member of, did not want to interfere 
into another countries “domestic” and internal political issues and therefore would like to respect 
their sovereignty.267 However, a lot of scholars have concluded that the main reason why Habibie 
made this policy shift, was to win the favor of the international community and to ensure the 
continued flow of foreign aid from the IMF and World Bank especially with the economic crisis 
that Indonesia was going through.268 Moreover, the political climate started changing in the 
1990s internationally. The Cold War era was coming to an end with the continuous weakening 
and disintegration of the USSR. Hence, the main ideological reason for Indonesia’s occupation 
of East Timor; which they claimed was to contain the communist Fretilin party, was no longer 
relevant.269  
An event that illustrated the change in the political climate internationally was the massacre 
that was orchestrated by Indonesia against anti-Indonesian protestors in Dili in 1991, which 
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resulted in the killing of more than 180 locals. This event garnered international attention as a 
human rights violation by Indonesia that was heavily criticized by the international community – 
something which was not imaginable during the Cold War era.270 More attention was gained on 
the East Timor issue when Fretilin leader José Ramos-Horta and the Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Dili, Carlos Belo used the platform of gaining a joint Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 to criticize the 
actions and occupation of Indonesia on East Timor.271   
3. Tripartite Negotiations  
After President Habibie’s announcement on autonomy, Secretary General Kofi Anan 
decided to revive the tripartite negotiations. These negotiations were organized and executed 
under the auspices of the UN. Portugal was a party in the agreement as the administering (de 
jure) power, whereas Indonesia was the occupying (de facto) power. This was a significant 
development in East Timorese history since they could not have imagined any of these events 
happening in the 15 years that preceded these talks. The negotiations were at first focused on the 
autonomy proposal. What Habibie offered was special autonomy rather than independence. On 
the other hand, Portugal wanted to consider that this special autonomy was merely a transition to 
East Timor gaining full independence. Several factors pressured Habibie to allow a provision on 
a referendum. One of the main factors was the effort made by Australia after they had a shift in 
their policy towards East Timor after Prime Minister John Howard came to power.  
Australia was one of the first countries to accept the annexation of East Timor by 
Indonesia in 1975. In 1978 Australia recognized that Indonesia was the de jure ruler of East 
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Timor since Australia was eager to come to an agreement on the seabed boundaries between it 
and East Timor.272 However, Australia shifted its position under prime Minister John Howard, 
advocating for East Timor’s self-determination instead. What the Australian government did was 
develop a survey to ask the East Timorese diaspora of their opinion on the situation.273 The 
results were laid out in a letter sent from Howard to Habibie on December 1998, in which 
Howard emphasized that the East Timorese issue could only be solved if a referendum was on 
the table since most of the people that were surveyed insisted on independence. He suggested 
that the Matignon accords, that allowed the people of New Caledonia a referendum, could be 
used as a model to deal with the East Timorese crisis. This was suggested since the Matignon 
Accord stipulated that a referendum on the question of their independence from France would be 
held 10 years after the signing of the agreement. The suggested process was that the referendum 
would be held after East Timor is able to develop political institutions, restructure their 
infrastructure as well as form confidence building measures.274     
On January 1999, President Habibie declared that he agrees on the holding of a 
referendum where if the East Timorese vote against autonomy then they would gain 
independence. This offer was then brought to New York to discuss with the UN and Portugal 
which resulted in the formation of the May 5 Agreement in 1999. The first issue in the 
negotiations was the word ‘referendum’ which Indonesia disliked. Hence, the parties decided to 
call the process a ‘popular consultation’. There was also the issue of the timing of when to have 
this ‘popular consultation’ in which the UN and the rest of the Western countries were 
advocating to be held after a few years of autonomy. However, Habibie rejected that idea and 
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wanted the referendum to be held as soon as possible in which this issue would be resolved by 
2000.275 Although the UN and the western countries had an idea of the risk this could bring to 
the issue, they wanted to take the opportunity to ride the wave of this decision since this is the 
first time in twenty-four years that Indonesia ever mentioned or discussed the option of 
independence.276 
Another issue that they were concerned about was that Indonesia was adamant about 
being the sole responsible force of security before and after the ballot and rejecting any sort of 
international peacekeeping presence during the May 5 agreement negotiations.277 The only 
external presence that Indonesia could allow was a small UN civil police force that would advise 
Indonesian police, and allowed a smaller number of military liaison officers. The UN wanted to 
see the disarmament of pro-independence militias and a considerable reduction in the presence of 
the Indonesian army. However, all of these security requirements were not laid out but only 
vaguely mentioned in the security annex under the main agreement. This security arrangement 
was the concession that the UN and Portugal had to give in order for Indonesia to agree on the 
holding of the referendum. Indonesia clearly stated that they wanted the exclusive power to 
providing security if they were to accept the holding of a referendum.278 
4. May 5 Agreement 
These negotiations resulted in the New York Agreements signed by Portugal and 
Indonesia on May 1999.  Hence, the legal framework of the East Timor referendum is the New 
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York Agreement which consists of three main parts in the framework (1) main agreement (2) 
modalities (3) security.279  
The main agreement annex 1 article 2 stipulates that the Secretary General should be 
responsible in establishing a UN mission to organize the ‘popular consultation’; “Request the 
Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the signing of this Agreement, an appropriate 
United Nations mission in East Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular 
consultation.”280 Moreover, annex 1 article 7 requests that the UN  remain in East Timor after the 
consultation during its transitional period in order to implement whatever the result may be; 
“During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of 
the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an 
adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.”281  
The main agreement also includes an appendix where a constitutional framework for a 
special autonomy for East Timor was laid out, should the vote be in favor of autonomy. 
Indonesia would have established the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET). The 
SARET would have had control of their economic, political and social policies with the 
exception of foreign affairs, defense and fiscal policies.282 The section also lays out the structure 
of the judicial, executive and legislative systems of SARET. However, article 6 in annex 1 does 
guarantee that should the result of the referendum be in favor independence, then Indonesia will 
take the necessary constitutional means to, “…. terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring 
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under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976…”.283 The article further 
clarifies that Indonesia will also take the necessary measures to arrange a, “…peaceful and 
orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations.”284 
As for the modalities section (annex II), it stipulates the technicalities of organizing the 
‘popular consultation’ process. Some of the issues under this section ranges from the date of 
consultation, voter registration and qualification, the question that will be asked in the ballot, 
timetable for the consultation process etc. Annex II A scheduled the popular consultation on, 
“…Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside and outside East Timor.”285 Annex II section D sets out 
the schedule for the operational stages of the consultation process; “… Public information 
programme / voter education, 10 May – 5 August; Preparation and Registration, 13 June – 17 
July…Political Campaign, 20 July – 5 August…”286  
The security arrangements were briefly mentioned in annex II and more articles were set 
out in annex III on the security arrangements during the preparations of the ‘popular 
consultation’, as well as when the ballot is held and the period after that. Annex II G dictates that 
the Indonesian army will be responsible for guaranteeing, “…a secure environment for a free and 
fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations 
personnel.”287 Moreover, it limits the amount of security personnel the UN is allowed to deploy 
on the territory, where there would only be UN civilian police deployed to provide advisory 
assistance to the Indonesian police288; “…A number of international civilian police will be 
available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the 
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popular consultation…”289 The most important provision in annex III is article 1 which stipulates 
a pre-requisite on the Indonesian army to ensure a peaceful and secure environment before the 
holding of the consultation;  “A secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of 
intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor. 
Responsibility to ensure such an environment… rests with the appropriate Indonesian security 
authorities.”290  
4.1 Incentives  
The main incentives that were pushing Indonesia to consider the independence of East 
Timor were mostly external factors, that were discussed above in the ripeness section. It was the 
great attention that the East Timor issue garnered in the international community that pressured 
Indonesia into conceding to the ‘popular consultation’ provision. Moreover, Habibie wanted to 
ensure that they are on the good side of the international community in order to continue gaining 
monetary aid from them.291 The international community welcomed this proposal and believed it 
was a democratic gesture that illustrated that Habibie was moving away from Suharto’s past 
wrongdoings. However, this proposal was met with mixed reaction in Indonesia. The proposal 
did not please the commander of the Indonesia armed forced General Wiranto. The same 
reaction came from the Muslim leaders in Indonesia – arguing that, because the majority of East 
Timorese are Catholics, their vote would go for independence, which could encourage other 
secessionist movements in Indonesia such as Aceh and Iriana Jaya.292 Hence, this was considered 
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a great costly signal on behalf of Habibie since he was risking his already faltering power and 
popularity in Indonesia.  
Moreover, the letters from Australia were not received positively by Habibie since they 
were suggesting to take the Matignon accords as a blueprint which Habibie felt was offensive 
since this was between New Caledonia and its colonial power France. Nonetheless, he did take 
the suggestion of a referendum to the People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia to consider 
giving the East Timorese an option to gain independence and therefore revoke the July 1976 law 
which made East Timor Indonesia’s 27th province.293 This costly signal given by Habibie, was 
more than enough for Portugal and the UN in the negotiations to allow a costly signal on their 
behalf by allowing Indonesia the sole authority of security in East Timor. Any concession to 
allowing peace keepers at the time of the negotiations was seen as impossible. Hence, Australia 
and the U.S. were advising and calling on the UN to not endanger the whole agreement by 
pressuring Indonesia on security provisions and requirements294; “The judgement of the UN 
negotiators, Portugal and other key member states, was that any attempt to impose on Indonesia 
an international security presence would mean no agreement and no popular consultation.”295  
As for the great costly signal on behalf of the East Timorese is allowing the UN and 
Portugal to be speaking on their behalf with no East Timorese representatives. The East 
Timorese leader Horta had his reservations and doubts on whether Indonesia would follow 
through with their promise.296 However, the announcement of Habibie was received positively as 
this was an unprecedented Indonesian policy in the twenty-four years of occupation. Moreover, 
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the UN being one the main parties to the agreement as well as the guarantees of the UN mission 
in the agreements played a big role in the appeasement of the East Timorese since this is added 
pressure on Indonesia to comply with the agreement. The negotiations were rushed and the 
agreement was put together abruptly, however Portugal and the Timorese National Resistance 
Council (CNRT) believed that they should take the opportunity to pursue independence as fast as 
they can after Habibie’s offer of a referendum.297  
5. Implementation History: 5 Years     
5.1 UNAMET   
The signing of the agreement did not decrease the scale of the violence in East Timor. 
The pro-integrationists were angered and threatened by the referendum announcement by 
Habibie, and received aid from the Indonesian army which set up the second wave of militias 
adding to the already existing militias. Although there was no explicit opposition from general 
Wiranto who was angered by the announcement continued to arm the pro-unity militias, as well 
keeping combat troops on the grounds of East Timor despite Jakarta formally announcing their 
withdrawal.298 One of the main goals of the militias and Indonesian army for causing all of this 
violence was to firstly provoke a response from the Falntin, armed wing of the CNRT , and 
illustrate that the conflict in East Timor is an internal conflict. Secondly, they wanted to form a 
crisis in which the Indonesian armed forces can use the excuse, that their intervention is needed 
to protect the East Timorese therefore pushing the proposal for international presence away. 
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Finally, they wanted to display to the world that East Timor is an area of conflict hence the 
international supervised referendum is doomed to fail.299  
On July 1999 the SC passed resolution 1246, “…to establish until 31 August 1999 the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular 
consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999…”300 The SC outlined their political, electoral and 
informational responsibilities301;  “… (a) a political component responsible for monitoring the 
fairness of the political environment… (b) an electoral component responsible for all activities 
related to registration and voting… (c) an information component responsible for explaining to 
the East Timorese people… the process and procedure of  the vote and for explaining the 
implications of a vote in favour or against the proposal.”302 At first their mandate was only until 
August 30, however Kofi Anan proposed to extend it until September 30. Later on, the secretary 
general requested the extension of the UNAMET’s mandate once again to November 1999.303  
 The UNAMET could start voter registration only when the secretary general is certain 
that the security environment was peaceful enough to allow for the holding of the referendum. 
The agreement scheduled the opening of registration on June 22; however, this was not possible 
since by mid-June it was clear that the security environment in the territory is nowhere near 
ready.304 The registration was postponed especially when the UNAEMT personnel were starting 
to be directly attacked. However, the registration of voters was initiated on July 16 despite the 
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escalating violence in the territory in order to hold the referendum by the end of August.305 
However, the secretary general emphasized that the opening of registration was not because the 
UN was satisfied with the security environment. What made the UN hopeful about this 
registration was the unexpected great number of people who came to register.306  A total of 
450,000 East Timorese in the territory registered307 with around 433,576 East Timorese diaspora 
in Indonesia, Portugal, Australia etc.308 The violence was only increasing when it was getting 
closer to the time of the holding of the referendum however, “…the people of East Timor 
bravely went to the polls to cast their votes in the referendum.”309 There have been several 
attempts at sabotaging the polling day in which pro-Indonesian hardliners were accusing the 
UNAMET of malpractice and therefore denying the legitimacy of this referendum and the result.  
Despite any expectations at the time, the poll was finally successfully held on August 30.  
There was a 98.6 percent turnout with no major clashes or violence during voting. The 
result was a landslide vote for independence, with 78.5 percent votes for independence and only 
21.5 percent for autonomy.310 After the announcement of the results on September 4, 1999, the 
eruption of violence that occurred was known as the ‘Black September’.311 The violence that 
erupted after the referendum was orchestrated by the pro-integrationist militias, which resulted in 
the death of 14,000 and the displacement of approximately 103,000 people.312 There was clear 
evidence and papers that disclosed the arming and training, and even commanding of the militias 
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by the Indonesian army. The purposeful violence that was orchestrated post-referendum was 
known to be Wiranto’s message to any region or island that is looking to gain independence.313 
These clear violations of human rights were frustrating to the UNAMET since they do not have 
the mandate to carry arms or take responsibility. They had to abide to the agreement that gives 
Indonesia the responsibility of upholding law and order in the territory. Moreover, there were no 
provisions stipulated in the agreement to prevent such disasters or even to reprimand Indonesia 
for their clear violation of not maintain peace and security to the territory.    
Soon after this eruption of violence, Kofi Annan made clear to Indonesia that if they are 
unable to take control of the situation in the territory then there must be international 
intervention. However, the countries although willing to aid and intervene wanted to receive 
Indonesia’s consent first and not make an unauthorized intervention as they did in Kosovo.  An 
SC delegation was sent to the territory to see the situation for themselves and discussed with 
government in Jakarta on the future actions to be taken.314 The U.S., U.K. Ireland, Brazil, 
Portugal and some of Indonesia’s regional allies were pressuring Jakarta to suppress militia 
activities. At first Indonesia was reassuring their commitment to the agreement emphasizing that 
there is no international intervention needed. However, after several failed attempts at curbing 
the violence, as well as the increased external pressure Habibie finally conceded to allowing an 
international force in the territory.   
5.2 INTERFET 
Deploying a UN peace keeping force, following UN procedures of mandating and 
assembling such a troop would have taken months. Hence, it was believed that a multinational 
 
313 Schulze, “The East Timor Referendum Crisis”; Martin, “International Intervention in East Timor.” 
314 MacQueen, “A Model Intervention?”.  
123 
 
coalition of the willing states to help intervene in East Timor could be assembled under SC 
mandate but outside UN procedures.315 By September 15, 1999 resolution 1264 was adopted, 
laying out the mandate of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) that was to, “ 
restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its 
tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and 
authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to 
fulfil this mandate.”316 However, it was emphasized that Indonesia is still responsible for security 
in East Timor and that the multinational force would have to work with close coordination with 
Indonesia; “ Underlines the Government of Indonesia’s continuing responsibility under the 
Agreements of 5 May 1999…”317  
The INTERFET was officially deployed only eight days after the eruption of violence 
after the announcement of the ballot results. This was an unprecedented speed of intervention in 
UN history. This new force was under the command of Australian Major-general Peter 
Cosgrove.318 In the course of weeks and months INTERFET was growing in number in which 
there were around 9000 troops which consisted of soldiers from 16 different countries. The force 
included forces from countries such as Bangladesh, France, Ireland, Kenya, Brazil, and South 
Korea. The U.S. and Britain sent them transport and logistical support. Surprisingly there were 
troops from four member of ASEAN, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, however 
Thailand’s role was bigger since they provided the deputy force commander.319 The presence of 
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ASEAN members was very important politically since this gave Indonesia a sense of having 
some degree of influence on this multinational force.   
The militia’s resources and capacities were too small to take on the INTERFET, which 
led to most of the militias to seek refuge in West Timor. The INTERFET were successful where 
they were able to manage the violence to the point that it never reached the same level of 
intensity as it was in the period before their presence.320 On October 19, 1999 the Indonesian 
People’s Consultative Assembly officially ratified the results of the ballot, thereby revoking the 
1978 decree of integrating East Timor. 321 A letter from the new Indonesian president 
Abdurrahman Wahid was sent to the secretary general declaring that Indonesia has officially 
ended its governance over East Timor. The INTERFET saw that East Timor does not have a 
functioning administration and all essential services and infrastructure was destroyed. This led to 
the establishment of the UNTAET by the SC. 
5.3 UNTAET  
On October 25, 1999 the SC issued Resolution 1272 that established the UNTAET, “… 
which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will 
be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of 
justice…”322 The UNTAET was given a very short time frame to form institutions, infrastructure 
and train personnel who will be prepared to take over when East Timor becomes independent. 
Kofi Annan appointed the Brazilian UN diplomat Sergio Vieira da Mello as de facto governor of 
East Timor who was heading the mission in Kosovo at that time as well.323 De Mello had an 
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unprecedented role of a UN official in a UN mission since he not only has legislative and policy 
authority but also had the power to form international treaties with others on behalf of East 
Timor324; as a result, as Kondoch noted, “[f]or the very first time in United Nations history the 
organization attempted to build and manage an entire state. The main achievement of UNTAET 
is that it created a stable and secure environment for a nation which has not lived in peace for 
decades.”325 
De Mello convinced the UN to allow the UN personnel and soldiers to use arms when 
necessary. Indonesia was also working in coordination with the UNTAET in getting rid of the 
militias in West Timor, and helped bring the refugees back to their homes; “By independence 
day, over 80 percent of the 250,000 refugees were home.”326 The UNTAET provided security aid 
until the East Timor Defense Force was able to develop their own capacity to take sole 
responsibility of the security of East Timor. On the administration aspect, the UNTAET came to 
establish the National Consultative Council (NCC) made of 11 East Timorese and four UNTAET 
members.327 The NCC’s responsibility was to supervise the decision-making process taking 
place during the transitory period of East Timor that will eventually lead to independence. 
Several Timorese leaders have voiced their disappointment on the issue of not having real power 
or voice in this council. They felt that they were not consulted on so many decisions and that 
they had to agree to most decisions put forward in order to ensure financial aid.328   
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What was asked of the mission was to prepare administration and institutions fast enough 
and efficiently hence, they did not focus on preparing the locals themselves to take over these 
responsibilities. However, the UNTAET did attempt to form a legislative body for East Timor 
when it is independent by transforming the NCC to a National Council (NC) in October 2000. 
The NC comprised of 36 East Timorese members from the civil society, political parties and 
businesses, therefore attempting to include more aspects of the population in the decision 
making.329 A mixed cabinet was also formed which comprised of four Timorese ministers who 
were in charge of economic and social affairs, and internal administration and infrastructure.330 
The SC extended the mandate of the UNTAET through Resolution 1338 on January 31 2001 
until January 31 2002; “…extend the current mandate of UNTAET until 31 January 2002, 
bearing in mind the possible need for adjustments related to the independence timetable…”331  
After setting up the council and cabinet, elections for the constituent assembly, were held 
on August 31, 2001 marking the second-year anniversary of the referendum. The Constituent 
Assembly is made of 88-members whose purpose is to draft the first constitution and help make 
the final transition into full independence.332 The Fretilin managed to gain 55 out of the 88 seats 
in the assembly.333 By February 2002 a national constitution was fully drafted, approved and 
adopted which leaves the elections for the first president of East Timor the final step to be taken 
before full independence. These elections took place in April 2002, which resulted in a landslide 
win for Xanana Gusmao receiving over 82 percent of the vote.334 This caused an issue at the start 
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of an independent East Timor since Gusmao has had issues with the Fretelin who were the 
majority of the constituent assembly in the past. However, Gusmao was able to put these issues 
aside and formed a good relationship with Mari Alkitiri Fretilin’s prime minister.  
On May 17, 2002 the SC adopted resolution 1410, establishing the United Nations 
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), “To provide assistance to core administrative 
structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor.”335 UNMISET was to 
focus on the border security issues that still remained after East Timor’s independence despite 
the enhancement of their relation with Indonesia. Nonetheless, the scale of violence on the 
borders never reached the scale that was witnessed before and after the ballot. The most 
important difference between UNMISET and previous security missions in East Timor was the 
localization of the troops in order to increase Timorese responsibilities of their own country.336 
East Timor finally gained full independence becoming the independent state of Timor Leste on 
May 20, 2002 and the 191st member of the UN on September 27, 2002. The UNMISET was later 
replaced by the United Nations Office in East Timor (UNOTIL) in May 2005. This mission was 
time limited to one year and their mandate was to aid the development of the capacity of the 
function of the East Timor state.  
5.3.1 Issue of Timing  
 The UNTAET faced many issues when governing East Timor due to the rushed manner 
of the whole peace process and independence process as well. That is why even after East 
Timor’s independence there was a need for the assistance of the UN once again; “Indeed, the 
continuing need in East Timor for public administration, law and order, and external security, led 
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the UN to create a post-independence UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).”337 
This was due to the very short time between the agreement and the holding of the referendum as 
well as the short time East Timor had between the holding of the referendum and their 
independence which was only two years. East Timor required a lot of work of starting from 
scratch to build a country that is able to run itself from infrastructure, human resources, 
governance issues and institutions etc.  
The UNTAET was established in an environment where the priority at that moment was 
humanitarian relief; “The extensive destruction that followed the referendum created immediate 
demands for relief and reconstruction… there was tremendous political pressure to demonstrate 
that the UN could act quickly and effectively.”338 A multi-purpose mission like the UNTAET 
usually requires at least six months of preparation. However, with the circumstances and reality 
of the situation and eruption of violence after the holding of the referendum so soon there was a 
rush in order to take control of the chaotic situation as soon as possible.339 The planning of the 
UNTAET was completed in only one month. Prior preparations were not possible since they 
could have appeared as already assuming/expecting or prejudging the referendum outcome. They 
were devoting their resources and time with basic food relief, health care and providing shelter 
for the thousands that are internally displaced as well as for the returning refugees. The 
UNTAET was established in order to help East Timor prepare for their independence however, 
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“Understandably, in the first months, less than 20 per cent of UNTAETs efforts was orientated 
towards preparing the territory for independence.”340  
Another issue East Timor and the UNTAET were facing was the power vacuum that 
Indonesia left behind.341 Had East Timor had more time to form their own civil society and 
political parties in, maybe this would have helped the UN to work together with the East 
Timorese. Had the East Timorese had time to develop and organize a decent civil society there 
could have been better harmony between the UN and the political parties of East Timor. After 
the referendum the only political party that was there was the CNRT however, the UN had some 
reservation in their recognition since they feared that this shows political favoritism especially 
when the UN praises itself about their neutrality.342 Moreover, the CNRT was a coalition of 
different political parties with no common ideological background and this was evident when 
they split and broke down in 2001.  
The preparation for independence were so rushed and tight that they had to draft a 
constitution in only 2 years just in time for East Timor to gain its independence in 2002. There 
was not enough time to build better domestic political institutions to deal with governance and 
socioeconomic issues in the country. The main issue with the UNTAET and UN intervention in 
East Timor was that the UN was attempting to help East Timor with democratization and local 
capacity building while at the same time East Timor was in the process of status determination 
and independence.343  Moreover, the issue with the UNTAET was their mentality which was that 
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they were mandated to act for the people but not with them. They did not put in enough time to 
train and include East Timorese in the development of their own institutions. This left the East 
Timorese still lost and unqualified to run their own country.  
Another issue was that there was not enough time for reconciliation. The UN did try to 
apply the South African Truth and Reconciliation plan by forming the East Timorese 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CRTR). This was only starting to take 
form a year before the independence of East Timor. Therefore, East Timor was entering into 
independence with a lot of issues and animosity still left; “Moreover, after the unequivocal 
victory of the independence supporters in the 1999 popular consultation, the domestic balance of 
power that later emerged left little space for compromise concerning those responsible for 
serious crimes.”344 Moreover, East Timor had to deal with the return of the large numbers of 
refugees returning from West Timor since the UNTAET was only given two years to deal with 
this task. There was also little progress in their economic development, since they were not able 
to attract foreign direct investments as any other developing country, “owing to the failure in 
solving the lack of land and property records, destroyed during the riots in September 1999.”345 
The investors could not guarantee whether the area or land that they wanted to build on was 
available for leasing or not. This issue was not resolved in time before East Timorese 
independence which again added to more pressure and agenda on the new East Timorese 
government which is still lacking in expertise and capacity to deal with such issues. However, 
this is not to disregard the amount of pressure that the UNTAET had on their plate with such 
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little time in which they managed form a legislative body which at least made East Timor 
prepare a constitution for their independence.  
6. Conclusion  
The conflict in East Timor was both inter- and intra-state. The dispute was between East 
Timor and its occupier Indonesia, as well as the pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor. The 
struggle for independence has been going on ever since 1975. It was only after the political 
climate started changing in the 1990s internationally and in Indonesia was there a change in the 
trajectory of dealing with the East Timorese issue. Furthermore, there was a plethora of new 
emerging countries after the fall of the USSR and breaking down of Yugoslavia. This put self-
determination as one of the main issues on the international communities’ agenda; “The 
construction of the East Timor question and its resolution have thus entailed multiple discourses 
and mediations involving international/regional/ local human rights groups, individual activists, 
the United Nations and states.”346 This is why East Timor’s issue gained unprecedented attention 
from the international community which is one of the main reasons that led Habibie to announce 
the promise of a referendum. President Habibie was also a very important factor in the shift of 
Indonesian policy on the East Timorese issue, since without his announcement on allowing 
autonomy at first, there would not have been any discussion on East Timor’s independence. This 
was a particularly a risky announcement from Habibie given the little support that Habibie had in 
Indonesia. This resulted in the formation of the May 5 agreement in a hasty manner, in order to 
take advantage of this ‘window of opportunity’ which could be lost if/when Habibie loses power 
Which could lead to his successor stopping East Timor from holding the referendum.347 
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Due to the hasty manner of the agreements, the referendum was rashly organized, 
however the result was surprising with a 98 percent of the registered voters making it to the 
ballot and the landslide result in favor of independence. Unfortunately, this great success, was 
overshadowed with the eruption of violence after the announcement of the result. The biggest 
criticism on the East Timorese issue is that the holding of referendum was rushed and too hasty, 
since East Timor has faced issues of violence ever since the occupation up until the signing of 
the agreement and after. Although the UN was in the territory, its mandate was limited by the 
agreements since it gave the responsibility of security to Indonesia, which proved to be a mistake 
since Indonesian army was not complying to the agreement and was actually orchestrating the 
increased violence in East Timor. However, the security arrangement was a major concession 
that had to be given in order to not risk the major steps already taken in the negotiations and to 
provide a signed agreement; in fact, as Ian argued, “[w]hat is remarkable is not that the 
Agreements could not include better security guarantees, but that they were ever reached at 
all…”348  
Nonetheless, at some point there was great UN intervention with several missions 
deployed one for the organization of the ballot (UNAMET), one for securing and maintaining 
peace (INTERFET), and finally the mission that took over executive, legislative and judicial 
powers as a transitory government for East Timor gain independence (UNTAET). Because this 
was a new kind of mission in UN history in which a UN diplomat was in charge of a whole 
country, it did come with a few issues and flaws; “A greater degree of administrative localisation 
would clearly have been desirable. But it would have been costly, time-consuming and, 
potentially, would have compromised the effectiveness of public administration at the point of 
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independence.”349 Another issue with the UNTAET is their unfamiliarity with the culture of East 
Timor as well as the short time and kind of chaotic environment they had to deal with. Despite 
troubles in the handing over of powers from the UN to East Timor, the UN’s essential role in 
East Timor was applauded for their swift decisions and executions given their mistakes in their 
belated responses in the Rwanda and Kosovo cases.  
Although the referendum was held only after a few months of the signing of the 
agreement, that was the main provision that was executed successfully compared to the rest of 
the articles and provisions in the agreement. Habibie’s announcement of giving the chance of the 
choice of independence which was a major costly signal was very important to the rejuvenation 
of the negotiations that have started since the 1980s. Moreover, it was the referendum and its 
importance that led to the East Timorese who were in hiding most of the time away from 
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Chapter 6- Conclusion 
Each case has been examined thoroughly through the retracing of their peace process 
succeeded by assessing the implementation of the referendum provision in each of their 
negotiated settlements. These cases will help answer the main question posed in the introduction 
along with the sub questions that relate to it. The main question was, (1) what effect does the 
inclusion of the provision of a referendum have on the likelihood of a lasting peace after a 
settlement in conflicts over territory? The sub questions were: (1.1) Does a referendum serve as a 
costly signal of intent? (1.2) What is the role of timing in the implementation of a referendum?  
1. Answer of question 1 & 1.1 
One can conclude from the three case studies considered in the thesis, that the answer of 
the main question, is that the inclusion of the provision of a referendum increases the likelihood 
of a lasting peace after a settlement in conflicts over territory. This confirms the hypothesis of 
the thesis that one of the main reasons for this positive effect is the weight of the costly signal 
that it carries. The offering of the referendum in all cases have been a major concession on behalf 
of the parent state. First of all, the idea of the referendum is seen as a threat to their territorial 
sovereignty which is why this is considered to be a great concession. Second of all, in all cases, 
they had internal issues of other regions seeking autonomy or independence. In Bougainville 
there was the Paupua Besenas who were also seeking independence ever since Papua New 
Guinea gained its independence from Australia. As for Sudan, it was spread thin since they were 
fighting on the western front in Darfur since they also had secession claims, as well as many 
other regions in the country. Finally, in East Timor Indonesia was also facing secession threats 
from Aceh and West Irian. Due to all of these internal independence movements, accepting the 
possible independence of a territory is a great costly signal on behalf of the parent state. With 
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this costly signal at play, it helped appease the seceding parties to accept negotiations and 
ameliorated the fear and mistrust of the opposite party and pushed the peace process forward in 
each of the cases to result in a comprehensive negotiated settlement.  
There were additional requirements attached to the referendum that dealt with the 
commitment issue, and assured the seceding parties that the parent states would implement the 
provision of the referendum. One main incentive to gaining their trust was that the agreements 
and all their provisions would be constitutionally guaranteed and legalized. While this guarantee 
was not available in the East Timor case, it was balanced out by the greater international 
attention and involvement of the UN that guaranteed the eventual holding of the referendum. 
Moreover, the only constitutional guarantee in the May 5 Agreement was that should the result 
of the ballot be in favor of autonomy, then Indonesia will take the necessary constitutional 
measures to dissolve the 1978 law that integrated East Timor to Indonesia making it the 27th 
province of the country.  
Other than the positive effect it has on the peace process, in two of the three cases there 
was no recurrence of violence in the 5 years after the signing of the agreement, with the 
exception of the East Timor case. However, this was due to the timing of the implementation of 
the referendum which will be discussed further below. The provision of a referendum on 
independence in a peace agreement, especially in a secession context, becomes the center of the 
whole agreement. As in the cases of Sudan and East Timor, any other provision could have been 
compromised but for both cases the postponement in the implementation of the referendum was 
out of the question for fear for recurrence of violence. In East Timor, although violence occurred 
both before and after the referendum, a further postponement of holding the ballot was not an 
option, since Habibie’s announcement was an unprecedented Indonesian policy towards East 
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Timor. Moreover, Habibie was not popular or powerful, hence the international community as 
well as the East Timorese feared that the referendum could be ignored or manipulated when a 
new president comes to scene since he was just an interim president. The result of the ballot in 
Indonesia came as a shock to Indonesia and their proxy militias which resulted in the violence 
after the ballot. However, had the ballot not been held, Indonesia would have not been able to 
record the actual opinion of the East Timorese, and allow them independence. As for the Sudan 
case, as seen in the chapter in the few months leading up to the referendum in 2010, there was 
lower violence. The NCP was aware of how grave the situation would be if the referendum was 
postponed or not even held. Hence, Bashir was vocal of his acceptance of whatever the result 
may be since he could not afford a recurrence of violence. Despite some provocations from the 
North the South resisted reacting with violence since they did not want any obstacles or excuses 
to not holding the referendum.  
In Bougainville, the referendum was delayed for 10-15 years; however, just the promise 
of the referendum and its inclusion in the constitution led to a peaceful post-conflict 
environment. There were also conditions that the agreement has set before the holding of the 
referendum such as beginning the countdown of years leading up to the referendum only after 
the first ABG elections. However, the ABG elections can be held only after the total 
disarmament of Bougainville factions, and illustrating good governance in order to establish the 
autonomous government of Bougainville. In order for the Bougainvilleans to start the countdown 
of years to reaching their main goal they were encouraged to avoid violence and comply with the 
disarmament conditions which lead to a peaceful Bougainville for the past 15 years.  
In this section, one can see that the costly signal aspect of the referendum is a great 
confidence building measure and does help ameliorate the commitment and trust issues which 
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essentially works effectively during the peace process. However, when it comes to the 
deliberative democratic theory and value deliberation concepts, they relate more to the effect that 
the referendum has as an important content and provision in a peace agreement. The deliberative 
democratic theory illustrates how the referendum as a content in a peace agreement, brings with 
it the weight of legitimacy to the peace agreement as well as to the claims of secession 
themselves. This is because the referendum is essentially the true opinion and vote of people of 
concern on the future of their own territory. As for the value deliberation aspect of the 
referendum; the provision is a result of great contention and obstacles in the peace process. As 
seen in the cases, even when there are many other provisions agreed upon the main provision 
that was a catalyst to the eventual signing of peace agreements as well as to the development of 
these territories, is the referendum. As will be discussed further below, the referendum had a 
great value content wise, in which without it, these cases would still be in the middle of 
continued civil war. These two main aspects of the referendum as a confidence building tool as 
well as its important effect as a major provision/content in the peace agreement result in the 
legitimacy of the process as well as in the referendum itself. Hence, with the weight of its 
legitimacy that is a result of all of these components, it increases the likelihood of durable peace 
in the post-conflict period.  
2. Answer to sub question 1.2  
These long years of postponement lead us to answering the last sub question of the thesis 
that inquires about the role of timing of the implementation of the referendum on the peace in the 
territory. Hence, other than the referendum’s importance during the peace process with its costly 
signal weight, it also has an important positive affect in encouraging peace in the post-conflict 
environment. More importantly the factor of its postponement to a later stage was another major 
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factor for increasing the likelihood of a durable peace. In the cases of Bougainville and Sudan, 
the referendum was held only after an interim/autonomy period, which for Sudan was 6 years 
while for Bougainville it lasted 15 years. This arrangement has allowed a breathing space in 
which the parties within the territories that were fighting amongst each other can work on 
building trust once again. Moreover, the autonomy arrangement for these years would allow 
them to gain experience in taking control of their own territory and allows them to develop their 
own political processes and institutions. Additionally, the postponement of the referendum was a 
great incentive for the parent states to comply with the peace agreement. The governments saw 
that this was a way for them to convince the seceding territory to not opt for independence when 
the time of the vote comes. This was one of the main conditions that was clearly stipulated in the 
CPA where the unity of Sudan should be the priority of both parties during the interim period 
therefore there was the formation of a joint government unit the GoNU. Likewise, the PNG saw 
the provision for a postponed referendum as an opportunity to work on bettering their relation 
with Bougainville through their resource and power sharing arrangements which they hoped 
would convince Bougainville to vote for autonomy. 
2.1 Importance of postponement and interim periods 
   The East Timor case is the perfect example of the importance of the role of timing, and 
how the postponement of the referendum leads to a peaceful post-conflict environment. With the 
East Timor case, the agreement was negotiated and written only in a few months, as well as 
scheduled the referendum only 3-4 months after the signing of the agreement. The East Timorese 
did not have enough time like Sudan or Bougainville to reconcile with the militias or Indonesia, 
which is why violence was still occurring before the ballot as well as lead to the eruption of 
violence after the announcement of the result. A reconciliation process was set up in East Timor 
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only a year before their independence, therefore there was not enough time for the pro-
Indonesian militias and pro-independence East Timorese to build trust within each other. 
Moreover, there was no reconciliation process before the signing of the agreement which was 
drafted only in a hasty manner scheduling the referendum only two months after the signing of 
the agreement. However, in the case of Bougainville they not only had an extensive 
reconciliation process before the signing of the agreement but even worked more on 
reconciliations during their interim period; “The ABG’s achievements also include… facilitated 
extensive (and expensive) post‐conflict reconciliation across Bougainville350… Importantly, 
some overdue reconciliations occurred between Bougainville and the PNG Government in early 
2014.”351 Sudan also had the same experience in which there was great effort made during the 
peace process to achieve reconciliation amongst the Southerners. Even after the signing of the 
CPA, Salva Kiir was focused on the issues of politics within the SPLM/A and had worked hard 
on hashing them out. Kiir managed to have the Juba declaration in 2006 in which he integrated 
other opposing militia factions that were opposed to the CPA and Garang to come under the 
umbrella of the SPLM/A. 
Moreover, East Timor did not have an interim period where they would at least practice 
some sort of autonomy to prepare them for their eventual independence. Due to their 
inexperience in governing themselves there was great UN intervention to the point where the 
UNTAET was established to actually govern the whole territory. Moreover, one must keep in 
mind that the UNTAET was established in East Timor when it was still in a militarized phase in 
which they focused in the first few months of their deployment on basic humanitarian relief 
 
350 Woodbury, “The Bougainville Independence Referendum.” 
351 Ibid, 10.  
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before managing to establish or prepare East Timor for their independence. Had there been an 
autonomous/interim period, the intensive UN intervention in East Timorese might not have been 
needed. On the other hand, Bougainville had 15 years to establish a constitution and make the 
necessary amendments throughout the years through practice, while East Timor only had one 
year before their independence. Bougainville and South Sudan even managed to form ministries 
as well as legislative bodies that helped draft their constitutions. Moreover, Bougainville went 
through three different elections which allowed them to practice organizing, securing and 
holding them. Bougainville even found their own way of governance which was a combination 
of official politics and customary law and traditions; “Beyond the state, there are other actors and 
institutions, customary ways and means of maintaining peace, controlling violence, and resolving 
conflicts… pursues positive mutual accommodation with introduced Western institutions and 
indigenous local institutions.”352   
 Although it is true that East Timor did form some ministerial offices as well as an 
assembly to draft their constitution however, there was a lack of ‘Timorization’ in this process. 
The issue with the UNTAET being the governing authority, was that they did not integrate the 
East Timorese in the process of building their institutional governance capacities. This was due 
to two main things, first of all the UN mentality and experience was always usually to work for 
the people but not with them. Second of all, illiteracy was very high in East Timor therefore to 
train the East Timorese needed a lot more time as well as funding which the UNTAET did not 
have. Therefore, East Timor was not prepared enough when it came to their independence and 
required even more UN intervention with the establishment of UNIMEST and UNOTIL. 
 
352 Boege, “Peacebuilding and State Formation.” 
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Moreover, Bougainville and South Sudan had time to build their infrastructures. Some 
important developments in infrastructure in South Sudan was the building of roads connecting 
rural areas to the big cities which provided access to markets and increased trade as well as made 
the communities in the South more connected.  By developing their infrastructure, they were also 
working on attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) in order to develop their economy. It was 
very difficult for East Timor to attract FDIs since there was still great unrest in the territory as 
well as their lack of infrastructure and capacity to accommodate them. Bougainville was working 
on the development of their human resources and educating their people. A UNDP report in 2009 
states that the Bougainville literacy rate was higher than the average of the PNG.353  
Had East Timor worked on their own education and illiteracy rates they could have had 
the human resources and capacity to form institutions with people who can function in them. 
However, the most common result in all cases is that their economic development was very slow 
and difficult to progress due to the disastrous civil wars that each of the cases went through. 
Despite the interim periods that Sudan and Bougainville went through to prepare themselves, 
they were not the perfect and complete nations according to international standards to carry 
themselves in their independence. Hence, this brings us to the point of East Timor which was not 
given any kind of time to even build its building blocks of a country and therefore had to be 
saved by the UN on several different occasions.  
3. Ripeness and Windows of opportunity 
Although the emergence of the referendum debate on the negotiating table is a very 
important factor for reaching a peace settlement, one does have to take into consideration the 
 
353 Joanne Wallis, “Ten Years of Peace: Assessing Bougainville's Progress and Prospects,” The Round Table 101, 
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ripeness and window of opportunities in each case that led to the change in the trajectory of the 
conflict to a negotiated settlement. This change in the trajectory of the conflict is what led to the 
emergence of the referendum debate in the peace process. The common factor or ripeness 
between all cases is that both parties felt a mutually hurting stalemate. The parent state reaches a 
point where they do not have the capacity anymore to be fighting the rebels in the contested 
territory. The power parity levels in both Bougainville and Sudan were on the rebel superiority 
level. For the Bougainville case, the PNG at its best capacity was able to deploy 500 soldiers 
from the PNGDF. Moreover, due to the Bougainvilleans forming a united front against the PNG 
after their own reconciliation process, the PNG was unable to fight them anymore especially 
with their war-weary soldiers. Even though the Bougainvilleans had the upper hand, most of the 
chiefs in the island believed that the best way to go about this is a solution away from the use of 
force since they already experienced a lot of suffering from the 10-year long war. 
 For Sudan, the GoS was spread thinly fighting on two fronts with Darfur in the west as 
well as the SPLM/A in the South. As for the South, the regional countries that used to aid them 
with weapons as well as provide their countries as bases from the SPLM/A were unwilling to 
help anymore in order to focus on their own internal political issues. This, with other internal and 
external factors that will be discussed below led to the Sudanese government and the Southerners 
to sit on the negotiating table. However, with East Timor there was no mutually hurting 
stalemate, but it was more other windows of opportunities as well as the changing political 
environment in the world, that will be discussed below that led to the formation of peace 
agreement.  
With all of the cases discussed in the thesis, when on the negotiating table there was a 
recognition that in no way other than by eventually promising independence through a 
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referendum could the parent states have appeased the seceding parties. In all three cases, there 
have been attempts to reconcile the conflicts for many years; however, no real progress was 
made until the discussion of a referendum was on the table or at least the stalemate on the issue 
was broken. In the case of Bougainville, although the negotiations were proceeding well, they 
did reach a deadlock since the PNG authorities always avoided discussing the matter of the 
referendum. It was not until Alexander Downer’s proposal on a conditional postponed 
referendum that the deadlock was broken, leading to the signing of the BPA. As for the case of 
Sudan, the Machakos protocol was the first important main step in the negotiations; in it, a 
number of issues were discussed, including power-sharing and security but also, most 
importantly, the promise of holding a referendum after a 6-year interim period. Finally, in East 
Timor’s case Kofi Annan has attempted negotiations since 1982; however, it was not until 
Habibie’s announcement of allowing the East Timorese the choice of independence was there 
real progress in the peace process, which eventually led to the signing of the May 5 Agreement.  
3.1 Internal and External Factors 
Another common circumstance that all cases share is that both internal and external 
pressures were at play. However, their impact varies from case to case. For instance, in 
Bougainville, the impact of the internal pressures was far greater than external pressure. The 
main internal pressure was the intra-Bougainvillian reconciliation negotiations that led to a 
united Bougainville focused on one main enemy which was the PNG. Moreover, the Sandline 
affair – related to the hiring by the Prime Minster of PNG of mercenaries – angered the PNGDF 
which made them realize that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of military anymore.  
Similar to the Bougainville case when the Southerners became a united front after their 
own reconciliation process, they were able to focus all their powers on the North. Furthermore, 
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the GoS at that time was weak due to the internal strife between al Bashir and Hassan al Turabi. 
However, unlike Bougainville, the international community has had a great impact in pressuring 
the GoS to take part of the peace process. It was the Troika (U.S., U.K., Norway) who were also 
part of the Friends of IGAD that helped increase the pressure on the North. Moreover, had it not 
been for the pressure and economic threats of sanctions it was receiving from the U.S. they 
would not have accepted the referendum arrangement. Sudan also wanted to improve its status 
internationally as well as to normalize their relation with the U.S. since Sudan was one of the 
main targets of the new American policy ‘war on terror’ after 9/11 due to their history of 
harboring terrorists and providing their territory for training. 
 Improving its international standing was also an important factor for Indonesia, since 
they had a long history of human rights violations against the East Timorese, as well as facing 
condemnation for its occupation of the island ever since 1975. Just like the economic threats that 
Sudan received, Indonesia also received pressure from the U.S. and Europe that led to Habibie’s 
announcement of the ballot. As for the internal factor that led to the emergence of the 
referendum was the new democratic reform phase that Indonesia went through after the fall of 
Suharto’s regime, and therefore wanted to find a quick solution to the East Timorese issue.    
4. External/regional intervention 
This leads us to an important factor that, although it was not one of the main questions of 
the thesis, has emerged from the analysis of the case studies as a factor that has a major impact 
both during peace processes and the implementation of comprehensive agreements – namely, the 
role of regional and/or external intervention in being a catalyst to the peace process or the 
implementation of the referendum. These external/regional players were usually either 
mediators, peacekeeper, implementers or a combination of either two of these roles and in the 
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case of East Timor all of them. This all depended on the context and circumstances that the 
external/regional players were exposed to, which shaped the form of diplomacy and approaches 
that they took. The most common one in all cases was coercive diplomacy with varying degrees. 
Coercive diplomacy is best defined as, “threats, persuasion, positive inducements, and 
accommodation were integrated into a crisis bargaining strategy… It is a strategy that combines 
threats of force, and, if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discrete and controlled 
increments…”354 The most important thing in coercive diplomacy is that the coercer must have 
the leverage and legitimacy in order to be able to persuade and push the state into retreating or 
halting their actions. The one being coerced must feel and understand the high cost of 
punishment that they could face if they did not listen to the coercer355; “Sources of leverage 
include the remunerative, normative, and coercive bases of power, which need to be packaged in 
a way that makes continued fighting painful and settlement rewarding.”356 
As already mentioned, Sudan and East Timor had the biggest external influence and 
pressure that was key to convincing the parent states to agree on adding a referendum provision 
to the peace agreements. The external players in Sudan played the role of mediators during the 
peace process. Coercive diplomacy was the main method that was used to bring the GoS on the 
negotiating table. In the case of Sudan, the U.S. had the biggest leverage to coerce the GoS since 
the U.S. used all three leverages mentioned in the previous quote namely remunerative, 
normative and coercive. The U.S’s remunerative threat and leverage was economic sanctions 
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which Sudan has already experienced before from the U.S. hence they were well aware of the 
great losses that they were expecting if that happened once again. As for the normative leverage, 
was the promise of normalizing relations with Sudan. Finally, the coercive threat, was the war on 
terror diplomacy that the U.S. was applying in their foreign policy.  Likewise, Habibie was faced 
with all three types of threats from varying players. The main external players were the U.N. 
which played the role of mediator, peacekeeper, as well as implementer. There was also a great 
amount of pressure from interested western countries. Habibie was threatened by the western 
parties that they would stop supplying Indonesia with foreign direct investments if the East 
Timorese were not allowed a referendum on independence. As for the normative leverage was 
the evident and deep history of humanitarian violations that Indonesia committed in East Timor. 
The final and main one, was the coercive threat from Kofi Annan and other interested western 
countries of either bringing security back to East Timor or facing international intervention. 
Habibie seeing the inevitability of international intervention as well as feeling the pressure of all 
the international attention that the East Timor has gained, he finally allowed the INTERFET to 
be deployed in East Timor.   
For Bougainville, there was very little to no external intervention with the regional 
intervention playing a bigger. Moreover, coercive diplomacy was unnecessary in Bougainville’s 
case. In fact, regional powers played a major role in all of the cases with little to no coercive 
diplomacy used. Australia was a major player in both Bougainville and East Timor. New 
Zealand was also an important regional player in the Bougainville case. New Zealand had 
reinitiated the peace process that was halted for almost a year by hosting a number of pre-
negotiation roundtables for the reconciliation of the Bougainville factions the ‘pacific way’ as 
discussed in the Bougainville chapter. After being successful and uniting the Bougainvilleans, 
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they also mediated negotiations between Bougainville and the PNG. New Zealand also headed a 
monitoring group from 1997-1998 named the New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring group. As for 
Australia, had it not been for Australia’s then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s referendum 
proposal no negotiated settlement could have been reached. The peace process was in a deadlock 
due to several issues on the referendum provision. However, his proposal allowed some 
compromises and incentives for both parties which eventually was adopted in the BPA. The 
proposal suggested the adoption of the referendum provision in the constitution as well as 
extending the postponement period from 6 years to 10-15 years. Australia also led a monitoring 
group in Bougainville from 1998-2003.  
As for the regional body that Indonesia belonged to the ASEAN all included regional 
countries that had a foreign policy of non-intervention. None of East Timor’s regional neighbors 
were a part of the negotiation process directly. However, the then Prime Minister of Australia 
John Howard aided in convincing Habibie to consider going beyond his autonomy 
announcement to allowing a referendum on a possible independence. Australia created a poll to 
ask the East Timorese in the territory and the diaspora on their opinion of a referendum and 
shared these results with President Habibie. Moreover, due to Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
preparedness for the escalating violence in East Timor, a multinational force (INTERFET) was 
created with the leadership of Australia swiftly in a matter of days in order to secure peace. 
INTERFET was successful in securing peace and security after the resumption of violence post-
ballot, and was headed by Australian General Cosgrove.   
 In Sudan’s case, the IGAD played a great role in initiating a peace process early on even 
if it did not gain momentum back then. However, a serious development in the peace process 
occurred when the IGAD restarted negotiations headed by General Sumbeiywo. It was due to 
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their initial efforts in the early 90s that resulted in the DoP. This document was a great step in 
Sudanese history even if it did not succeed in ending the conflict since it was the first official 
statement that called for the right of the South to seek self-determination through a referendum. 
The Machakos protocol which was the blueprint of the CPA was inspired by the DoP. However, 
there was great international intervention during the negotiating process as well. It was the 
Troika that provided financial and technical support to the IGAD. Furthermore, they had the role 
of observers which was the second tier to the conflicting parties and the IGAD. Moreover, the 
U.S. sent a special envoy to deal with the Sudanese conflict.  
All cases have also had some sort of UN intervention or presence with varying degrees of 
involvement. There is criticism over the UN mediating in civil wars, “Since it must always 
derive leverage from member-states, many of whom have different interests in and ideas about a 
particular settlement, the United Nations will never be able to make and deliver credible threats 
and promises.”357  However, in the East Timorese case the UN had enough leverage and even 
held to their promises on all the roles that were expected of them. The two cases that had the UN 
as merely monitoring bodies were Bougainville and Sudan. For Bougainville even the 
monitoring groups consisted of mostly regional personnel with only around six UN personnel. 
However, Bougainville needed the approval from the UN that they have indeed met all the 
conditions of disarmament before establishing the ABG which is considered to be an important 
role. In Sudan, the UN did not play an important role during the peace process however there 
was external help during the reconciliation process in the South. It was several NGOs mostly 
Norwegian based as well as the Norwegian Church aid who organized the People-to People 
process that was held from 1997-2003. Had there been no reconciliation between the Southerners 
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and a united front, then an agreement with the North would not have existed. The one important 
role the UN played before the signing of the CPA was the holding of a Security Council meeting 
pressuring both parties by giving an ultimatum of reaching an agreement by the end of 2004, 
which was the only form of coercive diplomacy that the UN used in the whole process. The UN 
has also played its usual role in most conflict-ridden countries which is peacekeeping with the 
establishment of UNMIS. Moreover, there were several GA resolutions passed after the singing 
of the CPA calling for the resolving of the Abyei region issue. However, when it came to the 
organization and implementation of the referendum the authority belonged to the Sudanese 
themselves in particular the SSRC.   
For the East Timor case, the UN was a mediator, peacekeeper as well as implementer. 
The UN has played a role from the beginning, starting with the various resolutions passed 
condemning the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia. Although the UN has had a more 
symbolic role in the beginning, the then Secretary General Kofi Annan did attempt to initiate a 
peace process and negotiations in the 1980s. Although to no avail, it was the pressure of the UN, 
the international community as well as changing political climate discussed above that led to the 
development of the peace process. East Timor is a distinctive case since the UN was actually one 
of the main parties and signatories to the May 5 Agreement in which the UN and Portugal were 
advocating for the independence of the East Timorese on behalf of them. Moreover, it was the 
UN that held the responsibility of organizing and holding the referendum. Later on, the 
INTERFET was deployed although not under UN procedures was mandated under the auspices 
of the Security Council. There was further intervention which was an unprecedented 
arrangement to UN history which was the UNTAET. The UNTAET was responsible for the 
administration of East Timor until they gain their independence. UN diplomat de Mello was 
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considered to be the de facto governor of East Timor, and this was the first time a UN diplomat 
took this role. Another UN mission was established after East Timor’s independence in 2002. 
5. Role of Individuals 
Another factor that should also be taken into consideration when discussing the factors 
that lead to peace is the role of individuals. For instance, the Bougainville peace process was in 
deadlock due to the referendum issue but it was broken when Alexander Downer released his 
proposal on the referendum which was adopted into the agreement. For Sudan, it was the 
emergence of a new IGAD representative General Sumbeiywo, who helped with the negotiations 
due to his knowledge of the history and culture. This knowledge aided him in forming truce and 
reconciliation meetings amongst the Northerners and Southerners. Moreover, his personality was 
strong enough to stand up to the Troika so that they would not take over the whole process in 
order to make it a regional effort. Garang the leader of the SPLMA, was also a very important 
figure in the peace process since the attitude of the South has changed after his sudden death. 
Garang was genuinely working with the North towards unity. It was Garang’s personal 
relationship with Taha that helped advocate the unity of Sudan as well as gained the Southerners 
several institutional powers in the GoS. However, after Kiir took over power the South was 
preparing for its eventual independence. In the East Timor case, the individual factor is even 
more important to consider. It was President Habibie’s unilateral announcement of granting 
autonomy that initiated serious developments in the East Timorese issues. The referendum 
provision was not an outcome of official negotiations but once again the unilateral 
announcement Habibie. Had it not been for the fall of the Suharto regime and the emergence of 
Habibie’s power, Indonesia’s policies towards East Timor would not have changed whatsoever.  
6. Limitations of Research 
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 There are several criticism and limitations that are paired with the case study 
methodology. One of the most frequent criticism is how can case studies and their contexts help 
explain general theories and phenomena. Whatever works for a certain case study could be due 
to the certain contexts and factors that are at play therefore, it is difficult to make casual links to 
general conclusions. Another limitation is the issue of biased case selection which is the bias of 
the researcher in choosing case studies to fit their own hypothesis. It is difficult in political 
science to generalize certain methods or theories and case studies adds to this issue even more. 
Some would say that there is a great limitation in the cases where there are other secession cases 
are not considered here. Moreover, another limitation is not including cases that do not have any 
referendums at all in order to further illustrate the importance of a referendum. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction the sole focus of the thesis is the positive effect that the 
referendum has on the three cases that are very distinctive from each other.  
Another limitation in my research is the sole use of secondary sources. However, there 
were several secondary sources that were written by mediators that were present as well as 
country leaders. There is also the issue on the definition of peace which is quite difficult to have 
a universal definition that can applied to everything. The point of peace in thesis is not that 
referendums brings absolute peace but one can suggest that it is good for relations between 
warring parties.  Nonetheless, what I hope this research does is that maybe future projects can try 
to apply some of the successful factors and methods that were illustrated and apply them to other 
cases in order to add more cases that explain general theories on instruments that lead to peaceful 
post-conflict environments. Moreover, I hope my research could add more information in the 
conflict resolution studies which are the most important due to the increasing number of conflicts 
around the world every year.  
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7. Concluding remarks  
When it comes to conflict resolution all that can be done is to reflect on past cases and 
learn from them. One cannot generalize that what has worked for Bougainville, for example, can 
work for other contexts. However, if the best parts of each case can be taken and applied 
depending on the context, then peacekeeping missions or mediators would be coming close to a 
perfect plan for peace. As seen in these conflicts concerning territory, the provision of the 
referendum was seen as the center of not only the peace process but also the agreement and the 
post-conflict period. Moreover, it was the provision that could not be ignored that everybody 
complied to and implemented with no major delays. Despite the violence that erupted after the 
referendum, East Timor succeeded in becoming independent and even being legitimate by 
becoming a UN member state. The missing equation in the East Timorese case that could have 
possibly made it more peaceful after the signing of the agreement was allowing a few years of 
autonomy and the postponement of the referendum for a later stage. However, at the end all 
cases did eventually gain their independence. Although there were issues of violence in varying 
degrees after the signing of the agreements it eventually was peaceful and never reached the 
scale it was before the signing of the agreement. Finally, the referendum gave them the added 
legitimacy to their claims and goals of independence which lead to the addition of South Sudan 
and East Timor as UN member states, and Bougainville on its way after the landslide vote for 
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